Why No One Seems to Be Ending Poland’s Demographic Crash: Lessons for the West, By Mrs. R. Miller and Richard Miller (Londonistan)

Poland's plummeting fertility rate and shrinking population, down to 37.49 million in 2024 with a loss of 147,000 people from the previous year, reflect a demographic crisis that mirrors the inertia seen in global efforts to prevent escalating conflicts. The following factors explain why reversing this trend remains elusive, drawing parallels to the barriers outlined in the blog essay by Richardtoday, dealing withglobal conflict:

Economic and Social Uncertainty: The article extracted below, cites Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, who points to external shocks like Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine as key drivers of declining fertility, as they create uncertainty among young people. A University of Warsaw study further notes that Gen Z cites poor housing conditions, unstable jobs, and financial insecurity as major deterrents to having children. This mirrors the essay's point about domestic distractions diverting focus from long-term solutions. Just as global leaders are preoccupied with internal political pressures, Polish policymakers struggle to address economic instability, which discourages family formation. For example, despite Poland's GDP growth of 2.9% in 2024, the benefits of economic progress haven't translated into the stability needed for young people to start families.

Ineffective Policy Measures: The previous Law and Justice (PiS) government's "500+" (now "800+") child benefit program briefly increased births but failed to sustain the trend, as acknowledged by PiS in 2020. The current government has maintained these benefits and restored IVF funding, but these measures haven't reversed the decline. This parallels the essay's observation about the erosion of international institutions, where well-intentioned but poorly executed efforts fail to address root causes. As demographer Irena E. Kotowska notes, policies based on traditional family models rather than addressing modern needs, like childcare access and work-life balance, are ineffective. Urban areas with better childcare infrastructure, like Gdańsk and Warsaw, show slightly higher fertility rates (1.5 vs. 1.42 nationally in 2019), but scaling such solutions nationwide remains a challenge.

Cultural and Legal Barriers: The 2021 tightening of Poland's abortion law, banning terminations even for severe birth defects, has deterred potential parents, with over half of Poles believing it reduces willingness to have children. This aligns with the essay's point about polarisation stifling progress, as ideological divides, here, between conservative policies and public sentiment, hinder pragmatic solutions. The election of a nationalist leader like Karol Nawrocki, who opposes IVF funding, further complicates efforts, as seen in X posts criticising his stance during a demographic crisis. This reflects concerns about the lack of visionary leadership, where ideological rigidity trumps practical action.

Demographic Inertia: Three decades of low fertility have reduced the number of women of reproductive age, a structural issue that GUS says will persist. The average age of first-time mothers has risen to 29.1 years in 2024 from 22.7 in 1990, reflecting delayed family planning due to economic and social pressures. This mirrors the essay's point about the inertia of escalation in global conflicts, where long-term trends (like nuclear proliferation or low fertility) become harder to reverse over time. Even with high immigration, 1.13 million foreigners in Poland's social insurance system in 2023, the demographic deficit persists, as immigrants cannot fully offset the low birth rate.

Global Instability's Ripple Effects: Global tensions, such as the war in Ukraine and U.S.-China rivalry, distract from cooperative solutions. In Poland, the nearby Ukraine conflict exacerbates economic and psychological uncertainty, discouraging young people from starting families. X posts note a "loss of traditional Catholic faith" among youth, compounded by war-related fears, as a factor in Poland's fertility collapse. Fear-driven narratives amplify public anxiety, further depressing birth rates.

Lack of Comprehensive Solutions: While the government has introduced measures like nursery expansions and free prenatal diagnostics, these are piecemeal compared to the scale of the crisis. The call for multilateral talks and economic incentives to de-escalate global conflicts finds a parallel here: Poland needs a coordinated, evidence-based strategy addressing housing, job stability, and childcare, rather than relying on financial handouts or ideological policies. The state social insurance agency estimates Poland needs two million foreign workers by 2035 to counter aging, yet immigration alone isn't a complete fix without boosting fertility.

Public Disillusionment: Over half of Gen Z in the University of Warsaw study said nothing would convince them to have children, reflecting a deeper societal shift. This echoes this essay's point about public narratives and media amplifying despair, reducing trust in institutions. On X, posts lament Poland's projected population drop to 20 million within decades, signalling a public sense of inevitability that parallels the fatalism surrounding global conflict risks.

The term "frozen" likely refers to the stalled progress in addressing Poland's demographic crisis, akin to the "frozen" state of diplomacy in global conflicts. Just as the essay describes a lack of proactive de-escalation in geopolitical flashpoints, Poland's demographic policies are stuck in a cycle of ineffective measures and ideological debates. The restoration of IVF funding in 2024, which led to 951 births by mid-2025, shows some progress, but opposition from figures like Nawrocki and persistent economic barriers keep solutions "frozen." This stagnation risks long-term consequences, like labour shortages and strained pension systems, much as unchecked global tensions risk escalation into conflict.

Poland's demographic crash, with a fertility rate of 1.099 in 2024, reflects a complex interplay of economic uncertainty, ineffective policies, restrictive laws, and global instability. While immigration and policies like IVF funding offer partial relief, reversing the trend requires bold, evidence-based strategies addressing root causes, housing, jobs, and childcare, much like the urgent diplomacy needed to avert global catastrophe. Without action, Poland's population could plummet to 29.5 million by 2100, with ripple effects as severe as those of unchecked geopolitical escalation, as Elon Musk tirelessly notes.

https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/06/02/polands-fertility-rate-fell-to-new-low-in-2024/

"Poland's fertility rate, already one of the lowest anywhere in the world, fell to a new record low in 2024, raising further concerns about Poland's demographic future with its shrinking and ageing society.

In a new publication of demographic data for 2024, Statistics Poland (GUS), a state agency, revealed that the fertility rate – meaning the average number of children that are born to a woman over her lifetime – fell to 1.099.

That is just over half the figure that Poland recorded in 1990 (1.991) and well below the so-called "replacement rate" – the figure needed to ensure that the population does not decline – which is generally defined as 2.1.

While different agencies use slightly different methodologies to calculate fertility rate, according to the Population Reference Bureau, a US-based NGO, only eight countries in the world had a lower number than Poland's figure of 1.1 in 2024.

They include Singapore, Thailand, Ukraine (all 1.0) and, in last place, South Korea (0.7). Poland's rate is lower than Japan's (1.2), a country that has long struggled with demographic issues, as well as those of western European states such as Germany, the UK (both 1.4) and France (1.6).

Last year saw the number of births in Poland fall to a new postwar low of 252,000 while the number of deaths stood at 409,000, according to preliminary GUS figures. That marked the 12th consecutive year in which more people died than were born in Poland.

"The population situation in Poland remains difficult," wrote GUS when releasing the figures. It added that "no significant changes should be expected in the near future" to ameliorate the situation given that three decades of low fertility rates means there are now fewer women of reproductive age.

The agency also notes that women are having children much later than in the past: in 2024, the average age of a woman when having her first child was 29.1 years, compared to 22.7 years in 1990.

GUS also pointed to the "increasingly rapid ageing of society": in 2024, 23.8% of the population were above retirement age (60 for women, 65 for men), up from 16.8% in 2010, 14.8% in 2000 and 12.8% in 1990.

Changes in the structure of Poland's population according to age group, from the youngest (0-17) on the left, to the oldest (above retirement age of 60 for women and 65 for men) on the right. Source: GUS

Speaking to broadcaster TVN about the data earlier this year, Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, director of the Institute of Statistics and Demography at the Warsaw School of Economics, said that it is hard to pinpoint specific factors behind the falling birth rate.

"But the decline in the number of births could have been caused by factors such as COVID-19 and the subsequent war in Ukraine, which aroused uncertainty among young people, leading to a decline in the fertility rate," she said.

While it will be impossible to reverse the trend in the coming years, Chłoń-Domińczak recommended policies to give young people more economic stability – in particular steady jobs and housing – in order to slow down the decline.

The scholar also pointed to academic research and opinion polls showing that the tightening of the abortion law in 2021- which outlawed terminations in cases where birth defects are diagnosed – has discouraged people from having children.

A recent University of Warsaw study found that, among members of Gen Z (born 1995 to 2012) the most commonly cited reasons for not wanting children were poor housing conditions, unstable work, and a difficult financial situation. But over half said that nothing would convince them to have a child.

Poland's previous government, led by the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, introduced a number of "pro-family" policies intended to boost the birth rate, most notably the "500+" (now "800+") child benefit policy that gave parents a monthly payment for each of their children.

However, although there was a brief rise in the number of births after the introduction of 500+, the previous downward trend subsequently resumed, leading the PiS government to admit in 2020 that the policy had not succeeded in its aim of boosting fertility.

The current government, which came to power in December 2023, has maintained the benefits introduced by its predecessors and has introduced new measures intended to make it easier for the parents of young children to return to work. It has also restored state funding for IVF treatment that was frozen under PiS.

Some of Poland's demographic deficit has been offset in recent years by levels of immigration that are the highest in the country's history and also among the highest anywhere in the European Union."