Western Australia's March Towards the Surveillance State: The Political Will to Power
Western Australia has taken another disturbing step towards the surveillance society, and the most troubling question is not whether the technology works. It is why Australia's political class appears so enthusiastic about acquiring powers that previous generations would have regarded as profoundly incompatible with a free society. The answer may be less complicated than the elaborate explanations offered by governments. Political power has an inherent tendency to expand, and where public resistance is weak, there is little to prevent that expansion.
Alexandra Marshall, writing in The Spectator Australia on 4 November 2026, examines Western Australia's trial of live facial-recognition technology, under which police scanned approximately 1.38 million faces over five months. The trial resulted in 122 arrests, contact with 146 registered sex offenders and ten welfare checks. Police reported nine incorrect alerts, and stated that images of people not on their watchlists were pixelated and discarded rather than retained.
These figures will undoubtedly be presented by supporters as evidence of the technology's success. The government can point to criminals apprehended, vulnerable people assisted and police resources used more efficiently. Yet this is precisely how surveillance powers become normalised. The immediate practical benefits are emphasised, while the longer-term implications for individual liberty are treated as speculative or exaggerated.
The fundamental question is whether the state should possess the capacity to identify and monitor ordinary citizens automatically as they move through public spaces. There is an enormous difference between police observing people in public and a computerised system examining the faces of everyone who passes a camera, comparing their biometric characteristics against official databases.
The former is an ordinary feature of policing. The latter introduces an entirely different relationship between the citizen and the state. It makes automated identification a routine feature of public life, even where the overwhelming majority of those examined are suspected of no offence.
The Western Australian trial involved a limited deployment using police vehicles, rather than a permanent statewide network. It would therefore be inaccurate to suggest that the state already possesses an all-encompassing Chinese-style surveillance system. But the significance of the experiment lies in the precedent it establishes. Once the principle of indiscriminate biometric screening has been accepted, the argument over future expansion becomes primarily administrative: how many cameras, which locations, which databases and which additional categories of people should be included?
The technology is no longer the central obstacle. The obstacle is political consent, and governments have discovered that public consent can often be manufactured through appeals to safety, convenience and the prevention of crime.
This brings us to the ancient problem of political power. Lord Acton's famous warning that power tends to corrupt was not merely a comment upon the personal morality of rulers. It reflected a deeper understanding of political institutions. Those who possess power frequently come to regard its exercise as both necessary and justified, while the restraints imposed upon them appear increasingly inconvenient.
The desire for power need not involve conscious wickedness. A politician may sincerely believe that greater surveillance will make society safer. A police commissioner may genuinely wish to apprehend dangerous offenders. A bureaucrat may regard the collection of additional information as a sensible improvement in administrative efficiency. Yet the cumulative result of these individually defensible decisions may be a system of control that no free society would have deliberately chosen at the outset.
The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche placed the will to power at the centre of his interpretation of human conduct, although his concept extended far beyond ordinary political domination. Applied cautiously to modern government, the idea illuminates a persistent temptation: the attraction of extending one's capacity to direct, classify, regulate and control the behaviour of others.
Modern technology has enormously increased the opportunities for exercising this temptation. Earlier governments required substantial manpower to monitor a population. Surveillance was expensive, labour-intensive and necessarily selective. Digital systems transform the economics of political control. Cameras, databases, artificial intelligence and automated identification can perform tasks that would once have required armies of informants and police officers.
The cost of surveillance falls, while its potential scope expands. From the standpoint of the administrative state, this is an irresistible combination.
James Burnham's analysis of the managerial revolution provides another useful perspective. Modern societies increasingly concentrate practical authority in the hands of professional managers, administrators, technical specialists and institutional bureaucracies. Formal political institutions remain, but much of the actual machinery of government operates through organisations whose decisions are difficult for ordinary citizens to scrutinise or influence.
Surveillance technology fits naturally into this managerial worldview. Human behaviour becomes a problem of information collection, risk classification and administrative intervention. The citizen is no longer primarily understood as an independent person possessing rights against the state, but as a data point within a system to be managed.
The language accompanying such developments is invariably reassuring. Governments speak of community safety, efficiency, protection and the prevention of harm. Few political leaders openly announce that they intend to diminish individual liberty. Instead, each new power is presented as a modest technical adjustment to an existing responsibility.
But liberty is not necessarily lost through dramatic revolutionary events. It can disappear through the accumulation of small administrative decisions, each seemingly reasonable when considered in isolation.
The Western Australian trial illustrates the process. Police understandably wish to identify people with outstanding warrants and locate vulnerable individuals. But the method chosen requires the automated examination of vast numbers of people who have done nothing to attract police suspicion. The intrusion is justified by the possibility of identifying a comparatively small number of persons of interest.
The nine incorrect alerts also deserve attention. Police reported that these did not result in arrests, although those identified were questioned. This is preferable to wrongful detention, but it does not eliminate the underlying concern. An innocent citizen may find himself questioned because a machine has incorrectly associated his face with an official record.
Nor is the reported false-alert rate the only relevant measure of performance. A proper evaluation should consider how accurately the system identifies people on its watchlists, how frequently it misses them, the consequences of mistaken identification and the procedures available for challenging errors.
More fundamentally, even a perfectly accurate system would raise questions about liberty. The objection is not merely that surveillance technology may make mistakes. It is that the government is acquiring a capacity to identify people on a scale previously impossible.
China provides the most obvious warning of where the combination of surveillance technology and concentrated political authority can lead. The Chinese Communist Party has developed extensive systems of digital monitoring, censorship and political control. Facial recognition and other technologies can contribute to an environment in which citizens know that their conduct may be observed and assessed by the authorities.
Australia is not China. It retains competitive elections, independent courts, constitutional institutions and substantial protections for political expression. These differences are enormously important. Nevertheless, democratic institutions do not make surveillance technologies harmless. The same technical capabilities that assist legitimate policing can be misused if legal safeguards weaken or political circumstances change.
The danger is not that Western Australia will become a communist dictatorship tomorrow. It is that Australians may gradually accept forms of state monitoring they once associated with authoritarian countries, without seriously considering the long-term consequences.
The question of political resistance is therefore crucial. Why are governments able to proceed with such experiments without provoking a sustained public debate about the proper limits of state power?
Part of the answer lies in the familiar argument that those who have done nothing wrong have nothing to fear. This proposition is superficially attractive and profoundly mistaken. Privacy is not a privilege reserved for criminals. It is an essential condition of personal independence and a protection against the arbitrary exercise of authority.
People close their curtains, maintain private correspondence and conduct personal affairs beyond the gaze of officials without thereby admitting wrongdoing. A free society recognises that the government is not entitled to know everything about its citizens merely because the information might occasionally prove useful.
Another explanation is the gradual habituation of the population to intrusive technologies. Australians already encounter extensive digital monitoring through commercial platforms, security cameras, financial transactions and online identification systems. Each additional development appears less remarkable because the previous intrusion has become familiar.
The COVID period accelerated this process. Emergency restrictions, digital certificates and systems of movement control demonstrated how rapidly governments could introduce extraordinary administrative measures when public fear was sufficiently intense. Whatever one's assessment of the necessity of particular plandemic policies, the episode illustrated the willingness of modern societies to accept substantial restrictions under emergency conditions.
The political lesson was unlikely to have been lost upon governments. Measures that would once have provoked widespread resistance can become acceptable when framed as essential protections against a sufficiently alarming threat.
Crime now performs a similar rhetorical function. Citizens are understandably concerned about violent offenders, theft and public disorder. Governments respond by proposing additional powers for police and administrative agencies. Yet there is a legitimate question whether the underlying failures of criminal justice are being addressed or whether surveillance is becoming a substitute for more difficult institutional reforms.
Catching offenders is important, but so are effective prosecution, appropriate sentencing, rehabilitation and the protection of victims. A surveillance system cannot compensate indefinitely for failures elsewhere in the justice system.
There is also a political asymmetry. The benefits of surveillance are highly visible when police announce successful arrests. The costs are diffuse, long-term and often difficult to measure. A citizen whose face has been scanned without incident may experience no immediate disadvantage. The potential danger emerges only when the accumulated system is expanded, compromised or misused.
Politicians therefore receive immediate credit for appearing tough on crime, while the political costs of diminishing privacy may not materialise for years. Future governments inherit the powers established by their predecessors, regardless of the original assurances about their limited purpose.
This is the ratchet effect of the modern state. New powers are introduced in response to particular problems, but they are rarely surrendered once the immediate justification has disappeared. Administrative agencies develop procedures, budgets, staff positions and institutional interests around the continued exercise of those powers.
A government that acquires a new surveillance capability has little incentive to abandon it voluntarily. Opposition parties may criticise its introduction, only to discover its usefulness when they themselves assume office.
Indeed, the Western Australian controversy cannot be understood simply as a dispute between Labor and conservative parties. Support for expanded police powers can cross ideological boundaries. Politicians who disagree passionately about economic and cultural questions may nevertheless share a remarkable enthusiasm for giving the state additional instruments of control.
This is why the issue must be approached as a question of political philosophy rather than ordinary party loyalty. A conservative commitment to law and order should not become an unconditional endorsement of every technological power sought by the police. Equally, progressive concern about civil liberties should not disappear when intrusive measures are introduced by a government of the political Left.
The central principle is that the burden of justification belongs to the state. Government must demonstrate not merely that surveillance produces some useful results, but that the intrusion is necessary, proportionate and subject to effective independent safeguards.
Such safeguards would require strict legal limits upon the purposes for which facial recognition may be used, transparent rules governing watchlists, independent auditing, meaningful remedies for wrongful identification and clear restrictions upon data retention and sharing. Any proposal for permanent or expanded deployment should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny rather than treated as an administrative decision for police management alone.
The public should also be informed about the potential for technological expansion. A system initially deployed to identify wanted criminals might later be proposed for monitoring protests, enforcing administrative orders or identifying individuals of interest to other government agencies. Such developments are possibilities, not established features of the Western Australian trial. But the capacity for function creep is precisely why limits must be established before the technology becomes entrenched.
The deeper danger is the gradual reversal of the traditional relationship between citizen and government. In a liberal democratic society, the state exists to serve the people and exercises powers delegated to it under law. Its authority is limited because the citizen possesses rights that government is obliged to respect.
A comprehensive surveillance mentality approaches the relationship differently. The population becomes an object of continuous administrative observation, and privacy is treated as a concession that government may permit when monitoring is unnecessary.
This is an inversion of the proper constitutional order. The citizen should not be required to justify his desire to remain anonymous while going about lawful activities. It is the government that should be required to justify its intrusion.
What makes the present situation especially troubling is the apparent weakness of public resistance. Many Australians have become accustomed to regarding technological change as inevitable. If a new system promises greater efficiency or security, opposition is dismissed as irrational fear of progress.
But technological possibility does not establish political legitimacy. A government may possess the technical capacity to monitor every movement of its citizens without possessing the moral right to do so.
The decisive question is not what technology enables the state to accomplish, but what a free people should permit the state to do.
Western Australia's facial-recognition experiment may ultimately be judged successful by conventional policing criteria. It may lead to further arrests, improved identification of wanted persons and more efficient allocation of police resources. None of these outcomes would settle the larger political question.
The real issue is whether Australians are willing to exchange a growing measure of personal independence for the promise of administrative security. Once that exchange becomes habitual, the boundaries of legitimate government action can shift almost imperceptibly.
Political leaders will continue to seek additional powers because power enables them to pursue their objectives, respond to public demands and strengthen the institutions they control. That tendency is not peculiar to one party or one generation. It is a recurring feature of political life.
The responsibility for restraining it ultimately rests with citizens, parliaments, courts and institutions willing to defend liberty even when the immediate benefits of surrendering it appear attractive.
The Chinese surveillance state did not arise merely because cameras and computers became available. It arose within a political order that permitted extraordinary concentrations of authority without effective democratic restraints. Australia's constitutional circumstances are very different, but the lesson remains relevant: technology magnifies the power of those who control it, and safeguards matter most before that power becomes indispensable to government.
The political will to power is a permanent temptation. Public resistance, constitutional restraint and a culture of liberty are the means by which it is kept within tolerable limits.
A free people can lose their liberty without ever voting to surrender it. All that may be required is an ambitious political class, increasingly powerful technology and a public that has forgotten the necessity of saying no.
