Trump’s Secondary Sanctions: A Total Trade Embargo on China or a Doomsday Overstatement? By Chris Knight (Florida)

On May 3, 2025, a provocative interpretation of President Donald Trump's recent secondary sanctions announcement surfaced, attributed to Mike Adams. Adams claims that Trump's threat to block trade with any country buying Iranian oil effectively amounts to a total trade embargo on China, Iran's largest oil customer. This, Adams argues, would halt all Chinese goods—pharmaceuticals, car parts, agricultural supplies, electronics, fertilizers, and more—from entering the U.S., potentially triggering an economic "doomsday" scenario: mass unemployment, famine, industrial collapse, and even threats to tech giants like Apple and Amazon AWS. But does this interpretation hold water, and could the consequences be as catastrophic as claimed? I will dissect the policy, its implications, and the likelihood of such an economic collapse.

On May 2, 2025, Trump announced via Truth Social that any country or entity purchasing Iranian oil or petrochemicals would face immediate secondary sanctions, barring them from doing business with the U.S. "in any way, shape, or form." This statement, reported by multiple outlets like Bloomberg and Reuters, escalates Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran, which began in February 2025 and aims to drive Iran's oil exports to zero to curb its nuclear ambitions and support for militant groups. China, importing around 1.8 million barrels per day of Iranian oil in March 2025 (per Bloomberg), is the primary target, as it accounts for nearly 90% of Iran's crude exports.

Adams interprets this as a de facto total trade embargo on China, asserting that "all Chinese goods will be blocked from entering the USA" with "no exceptions." This interpretation hinges on the assumption that China will continue buying Iranian oil, triggering Trump's sanctions and severing all U.S.-China trade. U.S.-China trade was valued at $760 billion in 2024, with China supplying critical goods like 80% of U.S. antibiotics, 40% of electronics, and 30% of auto parts. A complete cutoff would indeed be seismic—but is Adams' reading accurate?

Trump's statement is a threat, not a policy in action. Implementing a total trade embargo on China via secondary sanctions faces significant hurdles:

China's Likely Response: China has historically evaded U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil, using shadow fleets and yuan-based payment systems to bypass Western financial oversight (as noted in Reuters, April 2025). Beijing may simply ignore Trump's threat, as it has done before, especially since its economy is already strained by 125% U.S. tariffs and retaliatory 145% tariffs on Chinese goods (Yahoo Finance, May 2025). Posts on X reflect scepticism, with users noting China's past defiance and suggesting diplomatic or economic retaliation rather than compliance.

Practical Enforcement: Enforcing a total trade embargo on China would require unprecedented measures—sanctioning Chinese banks, seizing shipments, and policing global supply chains. The U.S. has targeted smaller players like "teapot" refineries (e.g., Shandong Shengxing Chemical, sanctioned in April 2025 for $1 billion in Iranian oil purchases), but hitting major Chinese state firms or banks would escalate tensions to a breaking point. Analysts cited in Reuters (April 2025) note that past U.S. efforts avoided large Chinese entities due to their limited exposure to the U.S. financial system, making enforcement complex.

Economic Self-Interest: A total embargo would hurt the U.S. as much as China. The U.S. relies on Chinese goods for critical sectors—pharmaceuticals (70% of active ingredients), electronics (e.g., 90% of Apple's iPhone assembly via Foxconn), and agriculture (fertilizers for 20% of U.S. crops). The Council on Foreign Relations (April 2025) notes that China is the U.S.'s second-largest export market, and a 2022 USDA study estimated $27 billion in export losses from earlier trade war retaliations. A complete cutoff risks a self-inflicted wound, which even Trump's administration might hesitate to inflict.

Trump's threat is better understood as a negotiating tactic to pressure China into reducing Iranian oil purchases, not a literal commitment to a total embargo. The U.S. has used similar rhetoric before, granting waivers to allies (e.g., during 2018-2019 sanctions) when enforcement proved impractical. Adams' interpretation assumes the most extreme outcome, but the policy's execution is likely to be more nuanced.

If Adams' scenario—a total trade embargo on China—were to materialise, the economic fallout would be severe, though not necessarily the "doomsday" he predicts:

Supply Chain Disruptions: Blocking all Chinese goods would cripple U.S. industries. Pharmaceuticals would be hit hardest—70% of U.S. antibiotics and 90% of generic drugs rely on Chinese ingredients. A sudden halt could lead to shortages within weeks, spiking prices and endangering public health. Auto manufacturing, dependent on Chinese parts for 30% of vehicles, would stall, causing layoffs (the U.S. auto sector employs 1 million directly). Electronics, including 90% of smartphones and 60% of semiconductors, would face production halts, impacting tech giants like Apple (Foxconn assembles most iPhones in Shenzhen, per The New York Times, April 2025).

Agricultural Impacts: Fertilizer shortages (China supplies 20% of U.S. needs) could reduce crop yields by 15-20%, per USDA estimates, raising food prices and risking shortages. While Adams' "mass famine" claim is hyperbolic—U.S. food production is largely domestic—price spikes could strain low-income households, where 12% already face food insecurity.

Employment and Industry: The trade war's ripple effects could cause mass unemployment. The Tax Foundation (April 2025) estimates Trump's existing tariffs cost $80 billion and raised household costs by $1,300 annually. A total embargo could triple these figures, with industries like manufacturing (10 million jobs) and retail (5 million jobs) facing layoffs as supply chains collapse. Domestic industries, lacking capacity to fill the gap (e.g., U.S. rare earth production is only 45,000 tons vs. China's 270,000 tons), would struggle to scale up quickly.

Tech and Cloud Computing: Adams' claim about cloud computing and tech giants is plausible but overstated. Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure rely on hardware (e.g., servers, chips) often sourced from China. A total embargo could disrupt data centre operations, but these firms have diversified supply chains (e.g., Taiwan, South Korea) and could pivot, albeit with delays and higher costs. Apple, more exposed via Foxconn, might face production halts, but its $3 trillion market cap provides a buffer to weather short-term disruptions.

Adams' "economic suicide" narrative—mass famine, industrial collapse, and tech failure—overstates the likely outcome. While a total embargo would cause significant pain, several factors mitigate a doomsday scenario:

Global Supply Chains: The U.S. can source goods from alternatives like India, Vietnam, and Mexico, which have grown as manufacturing hubs since the 2018 trade war. For example, Vietnam's electronics exports to the U.S. rose 30% since 2020. This diversification, while not immediate, softens the blow.

Domestic Resilience: The U.S. economy, with a GDP of $28 trillion, has capacity to adapt. Pharmaceutical companies like Eli Lilly are already repatriating supply chains (Yahoo Finance, May 2025), and Trump's tariffs have spurred some domestic manufacturing (e.g., MP Materials' rare earth expansion). Food security, while strained, isn't at famine levels—U.S. grain reserves can cover a 20% yield drop for at least a year.

Policy Backtracking: Historical precedent suggests Trump might back off if the economic toll becomes unbearable. During his first term, he granted tariff exemptions after industry pushback (e.g., electronics in 2019). The current threat may lead to waivers or phased enforcement, especially if China reduces Iranian oil purchases marginally to appease the U.S.

However, the risks are real. A prolonged embargo could spike inflation (already at 3.5% in 2025), push unemployment to 10% (from 4.1%), and disrupt critical sectors. The tech sector's reliance on China, while not fatal, could cause a 20-30% drop in production, per industry estimates, affecting consumer prices and corporate earnings. Adams' apocalyptic vision isn't entirely baseless, but it assumes a worst-case scenario without considering mitigating factors or policy adjustments.

Adams' framing focuses on economic collapse but overlooks geopolitical dynamics. Trump's sanctions aim to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions and regional influence, which the U.S. sees as a national security threat (Iran's uranium enrichment is at 60%, per IAEA reports). Cutting off China's trade could force Beijing to pressure Iran, achieving Trump's goal without direct conflict. However, this risks a broader U.S.-China confrontation—China might retaliate by restricting rare earth exports (89% of global supply) or escalating in the South China Sea, where tensions are already high. The establishment narrative, as seen in State Department statements, emphasises Iran's destabilising role, but critics argue this policy ignores China's strategic interests (e.g., Belt and Road projects with Iran) and could backfire by strengthening a China-Iran-Russia axis.

Adams also neglects the human cost in Iran, where sanctions have already driven 50% of the population below the poverty line. A total embargo on China might push Iran into collapse, but the resulting chaos—potential regime change, refugee crises, or a power vacuum exploited by groups like ISIS—could outweigh the benefits of pressuring Tehran.

Mike Adams' interpretation of Trump's secondary sanctions as a total trade embargo on China is an extreme reading of a policy that, while aggressive, is unlikely to be enforced as a blanket ban. China's defiance, practical enforcement challenges, and the U.S.'s self-interest make a complete trade cut-off improbable, though not impossible. The economic consequences of such a move would be severe—disrupting supply chains, raising prices, and causing layoffs—but not the "doomsday" Adams predicts. Famine and tech collapse are exaggerated risks, mitigated by global sourcing, domestic resilience, and likely policy adjustments. Still, the policy is a high-stakes gamble, risking U.S. economic stability and global tensions for uncertain gains against Iran. Whether this chapter becomes known as America's "economic suicide" or a bold geopolitical manoeuvre remains to be seen, but the stakes couldn't be higher.