Legal Analysis: Thirty Supreme Court Justices: How a Radical American Government Could Destroy the Constitution Without Repealing It (Same Strategy, Australia Too)
Justice Samuel Alito has issued a warning that deserves considerably more attention than it has received. Speaking at a Federalist Society event in November 2026, the Supreme Court justice observed that Congress possesses the financial power to bring the operations of America's highest court virtually to a halt. Congress could, in his words, turn off the lights. The judiciary, supposedly one of the three coequal branches of American government, is in important respects dependent upon the goodwill of the political branches. The judges cannot command an army, raise taxes or appropriate their own operating funds. Their independence ultimately rests upon constitutional arrangements that politicians must be willing to respect.
Alito's remarks followed the Democrats' recapture of Congress in the November midterm elections. But his warning points toward a more disturbing possibility than the immediate dispute over judicial funding. What happens if a future radical government decides that the Supreme Court is not merely an obstacle to its programme, but an institution that must be ideologically reconstructed? What if that government controls the presidency, the House of Representatives and the Senate, and possesses sufficient political discipline to use every available legal mechanism to transform the Court?
Consider a hypothetical American administration dominated by the most radical wing of the Democratic Socialists of America, or by a comparable movement committed to a revolutionary reconstruction of constitutional law. This is not a prediction of what the DSA will do, nor a description of its present judicial policy. It is a thought experiment designed to expose the vulnerabilities of constitutional government when those holding political power cease to regard constitutional limitations as binding restraints upon their ambitions.
Suppose this administration announces that the existing nine-member Supreme Court is an undemocratic relic of an eighteenth-century political order. Its members, the government argues, are disproportionately influenced by conservative legal doctrines, property rights, religious traditionalism and an outdated conception of individual liberty. The Constitution itself is presented as a document originating in a society marked by slavery, racial exclusion and restricted political participation. Those historical facts are undeniable, although the Constitution has also been profoundly transformed by abolition, Reconstruction, subsequent amendments and constitutional struggles for equal citizenship. Our hypothetical government, however, treats the document's origins as grounds for denying the continuing authority of its original limitations.
The administration proposes to expand the Supreme Court from nine justices to thirty. Why thirty? Because the precise number is less important than the political arithmetic. The objective is to ensure that the existing justices, whatever their convictions, become a permanent minority. Twenty-one new members, selected for their commitment to a radical interpretation of constitutional law, would transform the institution overnight.
There is a remarkable constitutional vulnerability here. The United States Constitution establishes a Supreme Court, but does not specify that it must contain nine justices. That number is determined by ordinary federal legislation. Congress has altered the Court's size in the past. A government with sufficient legislative support could therefore pass a statute expanding the Court, and a sympathetic president could nominate candidates for the new positions. Confirmation would require Senate approval, but not a constitutional amendment.
There would be political and procedural obstacles, including Senate rules and the possibility of electoral resistance. Nevertheless, these are not insuperable constitutional barriers. A sufficiently determined governing coalition could seek to change Senate procedures, enact the expansion legislation and confirm its preferred nominees. The existing justices would retain their offices, but their ability to determine constitutional outcomes could be overwhelmed.
The next question is what sort of judges would be appointed. Imagine twenty-one new justices drawn from a radical legal movement influenced by critical legal studies, critical race theory and transformative constitutionalism. These traditions are not identical, and their actual adherents hold diverse positions. But our hypothetical nominees share a more extreme conviction: that traditional constitutional protections are historically contingent instruments of social power and should be subordinated to an overriding programme of social transformation.
The First Amendment would provide an obvious test. Its text prohibits Congress from abridging freedom of speech, among other liberties. Traditional constitutional doctrine has developed substantial protections against government censorship, particularly discrimination based upon political viewpoint. But what if the new majority regarded certain categories of political expression as inherently oppressive, rather than as speech entitled to constitutional protection?
A radical Court could progressively reinterpret the First Amendment so that the government enjoyed much greater authority to regulate political expression deemed harmful to historically disadvantaged groups. Restrictions on allegedly hateful, discriminatory or socially destabilising speech might receive increasingly deferential judicial treatment. The result could be a dramatic contraction of constitutional protection without the deletion of a single word from the amendment.
Such an outcome would require substantial departures from existing precedent, and the constitutional text would remain an obstacle. But that is precisely the point of the hypothetical. Constitutional provisions do not interpret or enforce themselves. Their practical significance depends upon the judges who apply them and upon the broader political system's willingness to honour their decisions.
The Second Amendment would present an equally revealing case. Its protection of the right to keep and bear arms has been recognised by the Supreme Court as encompassing an individual right, subject to constitutional limitations. A radically reconstructed Court might seek to reverse that jurisprudence, adopt an extremely narrow conception of protected conduct, or uphold regulatory measures that rendered civilian firearm ownership increasingly difficult.
The words of the Second Amendment would remain unchanged. Its practical effect, however, could be substantially altered. A constitutional right that survives in the printed document but is interpreted so narrowly that it affords little meaningful protection has, for many purposes, ceased to function as an effective restraint upon government.
The same possibility arises in relation to religious liberty, property rights, due process and equal protection. A Court committed to a particular ideological conception of social justice might increasingly interpret constitutional guarantees through the lens of collective outcomes rather than individual rights. Religious institutions could encounter greater restrictions when their doctrines conflict with government equality policies. Property rights might receive less protection against expansive regulatory intervention. Equal protection could be reconceived in ways that place greater emphasis upon group outcomes than upon the treatment of individuals.
None of these developments would follow automatically from appointing progressive judges. Many progressive legal scholars vigorously defend freedom of speech, due process and judicial independence. The danger in this hypothetical lies in a judiciary whose members treat constitutional interpretation as an instrument for achieving predetermined political ends, rather than as a discipline constrained by legal text, precedent, institutional responsibility and the separation of powers.
The philosophical issue is fundamental. If the Constitution is treated primarily as an expression of historical domination, and its continuing authority is made conditional upon its conformity with contemporary ideological objectives, what remains of constitutional government? A constitution is supposed to limit what political majorities may do, including when those majorities are convinced of their own moral righteousness. If its meaning can be reconstructed whenever its restrictions become inconvenient, constitutional supremacy risks becoming a ceremonial fiction.
The radical response might be that constitutional interpretation has always involved moral and political judgments, and that the original American constitutional order contained profound injustices. Both observations have force. The American Constitution protected a political system that tolerated slavery, and constitutional development has often involved the correction of earlier injustices. But acknowledging historical injustice does not establish that constitutional restraints should be discarded whenever a government claims to pursue a morally superior objective.
There is a difference between constitutional amendment, interpretation and ideological replacement. The amendment process expressly permits fundamental change, but deliberately imposes demanding requirements. Judicial interpretation is unavoidable, but it operates within a framework of legal justification. Ideological replacement occurs when judges effectively decide that the Constitution's authority is subordinate to a political programme and then reinterpret its provisions accordingly.
The danger becomes particularly acute when court packing is combined with control over appointments, legislation, executive administration and public expenditure. A radical Congress could expand the Court, confirm sympathetic judges, restrict aspects of its jurisdiction within constitutional limits, and use appropriations as a means of institutional pressure. A sympathetic president could nominate the justices and direct the executive branch toward policies designed to test or transform established constitutional protections.
The Court could not lawfully be abolished by ordinary legislation, and Article III protects federal judges against salary reductions during their tenure. Existing justices could not simply be dismissed because the government disliked their opinions. But those safeguards would not prevent the creation of additional judicial positions or necessarily protect the institution against severe operational pressure. Constitutional independence is therefore more fragile than its impressive architecture might suggest.
Who, then, would stop such a government?
The president and Congress support the programme, the Senate confirms the nominees, and the expanded Court supplies constitutional approval. Under those circumstances, the question becomes less one of ordinary legal procedure than of the political culture upon which constitutional government ultimately depends.
A Supreme Court judgment is not a magical command capable of enforcing itself. The American constitutional system relies upon cooperation among institutions, respect for lawful authority, and a widespread belief that political power is legitimately limited. When those conventions collapse, constitutional language may offer less protection than citizens imagine.
There is an obvious historical parallel in Franklin Roosevelt's 1937 proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court. Frustrated by judicial resistance to elements of the New Deal, Roosevelt sought authority to appoint additional justices under specified conditions. The proposal failed amid political opposition, including resistance within his own party. The episode demonstrates that court packing is not an invention of contemporary radicalism, and that political institutions can sometimes resist even a powerful president.
But suppose Roosevelt had possessed overwhelming congressional support and faced no significant opposition. The constitutional architecture would have offered fewer immediate obstacles to expansion than many Americans might assume. The same structural possibility exists today, irrespective of which political party holds power.
Alito's warning about congressional funding is therefore only one aspect of a larger constitutional problem. A hostile Congress could attempt to cripple the Court financially. A more ambitious government could seek to capture it institutionally. The latter strategy might be more effective because it would preserve the appearance of constitutional legality. The marble building would remain, the judges would wear their robes, judgments would be published, and constitutional language would continue to appear in legal opinions. Yet the practical meaning of the Constitution could be transformed.
The question raised by the thirty-justice hypothetical is therefore more disturbing than whether the Democrats, Republicans or any particular ideological movement might one day pack the Supreme Court. It is whether constitutional government can survive when those who control its institutions no longer believe that constitutional limits should prevail over their preferred political outcomes.
A constitution that binds only one's political opponents is no constitution at all. And a Supreme Court transformed into the obedient instrument of a governing ideology, however noble that ideology claims to be, would cease to perform the independent constitutional function for which it exists.
https://www.zerohedge.com/political/dems-take-congress-alito-warns-they-can-turn-lights-supreme-court
