Free Speech for the Rich: How Britain Makes Speaking Your Mind an Expensive Legal Gamble

Britain still officially recognises freedom of expression, on paper. The right is protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated into domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998. Politicians regularly proclaim their commitment to open debate, democratic values and the traditional liberties of the British people. Yet the practical reality can be very different. As Michael C. R. Reiners argues in a November 11, 2026 article for Spiked, freedom of speech is becoming a right that ordinary citizens may possess in theory but cannot afford to exercise in practice. The problem is not simply that particular opinions have been prohibited. It is that the financial, professional and psychological consequences of expressing controversial views can be so severe that remaining silent becomes the only sensible course for people without substantial resources.

This is a particularly effective form of censorship because it does not require an openly authoritarian state. There need be no comprehensive list of forbidden opinions, no universal system of prior censorship and no declaration that freedom of expression has been abolished. Instead, the law operates through uncertain boundaries, potentially expensive investigations, professional disciplinary proceedings and lengthy litigation. Individuals discover that even when their speech is ultimately judged lawful, establishing that fact may consume years of their lives.

The case of Kristie Higgs illustrates the problem. Higgs, a Christian school worker, lost her job in January 2019 following Facebook posts expressing religiously conservative views about sex and education. Her comments were controversial, but the question was whether dismissing her for expressing those beliefs was legally justified. The dispute passed through employment proceedings and appeals before the Court of Appeal ruled in her favour in February 2025, finding that her dismissal was unlawfully disproportionate.

The important point is the passage of time. More than six years elapsed between her dismissal and that major legal victory. During those years, Higgs faced uncertainty about her employment, reputation and future. The litigation also involved considerable legal resources. How many ordinary workers could endure such an ordeal? A person with a mortgage, dependent children or limited savings might reasonably conclude that expressing a controversial opinion is simply not worth the danger.

The chilling effect extends far beyond the individual litigant. Other workers observing such cases learn that even legally protected expression may provoke serious consequences. They need not understand the details of employment law or the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. The practical lesson is unmistakable: controversial opinions can cost you your job, and recovering your rights may require years of legal struggle.

The result is a form of anticipatory obedience. People begin censoring themselves before any official intervention occurs. They avoid certain subjects, decline to express unpopular beliefs and remain silent when they disagree with institutional orthodoxy. The state or employer does not need to punish everyone. A few highly publicised cases may be sufficient to influence the behaviour of thousands.

An even more disturbing example concerns Hamit Coşkun, who burned a copy of the Koran outside the Turkish consulate in London in February 2025 while making hostile remarks about Islam. His conduct was deliberately provocative and offensive to many Muslims. He was attacked by a man armed with a knife and subsequently prosecuted under public-order legislation. After being convicted of a religiously aggravated offence, he successfully appealed. His acquittal was upheld by the High Court in February 2026.

The legal and moral issues should be distinguished. People are entitled to condemn the burning of religious texts as insulting, unnecessary or deeply disrespectful. Religious believers are entitled to express their outrage through peaceful protest and criticism. But the freedom to condemn an act is not the same as a legal entitlement to prohibit it. Nor should the violent reaction of an offended observer determine whether the original expression is criminal.

If the possibility of violence were sufficient to justify suppressing offensive speech, the law would create a dangerous incentive. Those most willing to threaten or employ violence would acquire the greatest power to determine the limits of public discussion. This is sometimes described as the heckler's veto, although the Coşkun case involved physical violence rather than mere disruption. The underlying principle remains the same: freedom of expression cannot be made conditional upon the willingness of others to tolerate it peacefully.

The Coşkun case also reveals the economic burden of legal uncertainty. His conduct passed through three levels of judicial consideration before the position was finally resolved in his favour. Whatever one thinks of his behaviour, the legal process itself became a substantial punishment. The individual was required to defend his liberty against the resources of the state, with no guarantee that the eventual outcome would justify the expense and anxiety involved.

This phenomenon is sometimes described as punishment by process. The accusation, investigation, prosecution or disciplinary proceeding imposes costs independently of the ultimate decision. A person may be acquitted, reinstated or vindicated on appeal while nevertheless suffering financial loss, reputational damage and years of uncertainty.

Reiners draws attention to the scale of police enforcement involving communications offences. A freedom-of-information investigation by The Times found that 37 responding police forces recorded 12,183 arrests during 2023 under two communications statutes, an average of approximately 33 arrests per day. These figures require careful interpretation. The relevant laws cover threatening and abusive communications as well as messages considered grossly offensive or otherwise unlawful. The statistics do not establish that every arrest was unjustified, nor do they demonstrate that thousands of people were prosecuted merely for expressing unpopular political opinions.

Nevertheless, the scale of enforcement is significant. When police powers extend into ordinary electronic communication, the boundary between criminal misconduct and controversial expression becomes a matter of considerable public importance. Citizens should be able to know, with reasonable certainty, when their speech crosses a legal threshold. Vague or expansive restrictions create the danger that individuals will refrain from lawful expression simply because they cannot confidently predict how police or prosecutors will interpret their words.

The problem is intensified by the multiplication of institutions capable of penalising speech. Police and criminal courts are only part of the picture. Employers, professional regulators, universities and digital platforms can impose consequences that may be devastating without involving a criminal conviction.

Consider the case of barrister Jon Holbrook, who faced disciplinary action over a tweet expressing a controversial political opinion. A professional regulator issued a warning and a £500 fine, both of which were subsequently set aside on appeal in March 2022. The outcome was a victory for Holbrook, but the episode demonstrated how professional regulation can become entangled with disputes about political expression.

Professional regulators have legitimate responsibilities concerning competence, integrity and misconduct. But those responsibilities should not become a general authority to police the private political opinions of professionals. A barrister, doctor, teacher or academic should not be required to adopt an officially approved worldview as the price of pursuing a career. Restrictions may be justified where speech constitutes genuine harassment, threats or serious professional misconduct, but ideological disagreement should not be treated as sufficient grounds for disciplinary punishment.

The distinction between professional conduct and personal belief is especially important in an increasingly politicised society. Institutions may present particular ideological commitments as essential to professional standards, even where those commitments concern contested moral or political questions. Employees who dissent may then face pressure to affirm beliefs they do not hold or remain silent about their objections.

This is not merely a problem for prominent campaigners or individuals seeking public controversy. It affects ordinary people who wish to retain their employment, professional standing and financial security. The worker who cannot afford dismissal is often more vulnerable to ideological pressure than the wealthy public figure who can finance litigation or survive prolonged unemployment.

Britain's Online Safety Act introduces another dimension. The legislation imposes extensive duties upon covered digital services, with potentially enormous financial penalties for serious non-compliance. Depending upon the applicable enforcement provisions, fines can reach £18 million or 10 per cent of qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.

The predictable concern is that platforms facing substantial regulatory exposure may prefer to remove questionable material rather than risk penalties. Where legal obligations are complicated and the consequences of non-compliance severe, cautious corporate behaviour can result in the suppression of lawful speech. The user whose post disappears may never have an opportunity to challenge the underlying legal interpretation in court.

This is particularly significant because much contemporary political discussion takes place through privately operated digital platforms. The practical ability to communicate with large audiences increasingly depends upon systems controlled by corporations responding to legal, commercial and reputational pressures. A government need not directly prohibit every controversial statement if its regulatory framework encourages intermediaries to suppress material pre-emptively.

Of course, platforms also possess legitimate editorial interests, and not every moderation decision constitutes state censorship. Private services may establish rules governing the material they host. The difficulty arises when government regulation creates incentives to restrict lawful expression more extensively than the law itself requires. In such circumstances, the distinction between private editorial judgment and indirect state pressure becomes politically important.

Reiners and his colleagues Preston Byrne and Elijah Granet have proposed a model Freedom of Speech Bill through the Adam Smith Institute. Their approach seeks to narrow restrictions upon expression, restrain public authorities and professional regulators from penalising lawful speech, and provide stronger protection for employees expressing views outside their professional responsibilities. The proposal also addresses compelled ideological assent and calls for repeal of the Online Safety Act, while retaining criminal liability and reporting requirements concerning child sexual abuse material.

The proposed legislation is not beyond criticism. There are genuine difficulties in distinguishing protected expression from serious harassment, determining the appropriate limits of employer authority and ensuring that the law can respond effectively to criminal threats. Repealing a major regulatory framework would also require careful consideration of how legitimate protective functions should be preserved. Nevertheless, the underlying objective deserves serious attention: freedom of expression should be protected before individuals suffer years of legal and professional damage, not merely vindicated after the damage has occurred.

The deeper philosophical issue concerns the nature of rights themselves. A legal right is of limited practical value if exercising it exposes the individual to costs that only the wealthy can endure. The formal equality of citizens before the law becomes hollow when their ability to defend their liberties depends upon financial resources.

A billionaire may be able to finance years of litigation without significant personal hardship. A school employee, pensioner or small business owner may face ruin after only a few months. If the law imposes comparable procedural burdens upon both, the nominal equality of legal rights conceals a profound inequality of practical power.

This is one reason why the old liberal insistence upon clear and narrowly defined restrictions was so important. Freedom is not adequately protected by allowing the state to impose broad prohibitions and then permitting individuals to seek exemptions through expensive litigation. The presumption should favour liberty from the outset. Where restrictions are necessary, they should be sufficiently precise that ordinary citizens can understand their obligations without requiring specialist legal advice.

The economic argument also reveals the weakness of relying entirely upon judicial remedies. Courts are indispensable safeguards against unlawful government action, but litigation is often slow, expensive and uncertain. A system that depends upon individuals repeatedly bringing test cases to establish the boundaries of permissible expression may already be failing to provide effective protection.

The costs of defending freedom should therefore be considered part of the restriction itself. If an individual must spend six years establishing that a dismissal was unlawful, the eventual judgment does not erase the burden imposed during those years. If a prosecution ends in acquittal after substantial financial and reputational damage, the legal victory does not mean that the defendant experienced no punishment.

There is an obvious Australian parallel. Although Australia's constitutional protection of political communication differs significantly from Britain's legal framework, Australians also face disputes involving employment, professional regulation, discrimination law and online expression. The practical ability to challenge an adverse decision may depend upon resources, legal representation and the willingness to endure prolonged proceedings. The same principle applies: rights that are prohibitively expensive to enforce may offer inadequate protection to ordinary citizens.

The broader political danger is the emergence of a society in which people remain formally free while becoming increasingly reluctant to exercise their freedom. The authorities need not prohibit every controversial opinion. They need only create an environment in which the consequences of speaking are sufficiently uncertain and potentially severe that silence becomes the rational choice.

Such a society may retain elections, courts, newspapers and constitutional language celebrating liberty. Yet its public discussion can become progressively narrower as individuals learn to avoid subjects likely to attract institutional disapproval. The resulting conformity may appear voluntary, but it is shaped by the anticipated costs of dissent.

This is perhaps the most sophisticated form of modern censorship. It does not always operate through the spectacular imprisonment of dissidents or the public burning of forbidden books. It operates through disciplinary letters, legal expenses, employment tribunals, regulatory investigations, account restrictions and the quiet calculation that expressing an unpopular opinion is simply not worth the trouble.

The consequences for democratic government are serious. A functioning democracy requires more than the formal existence of voting rights. Citizens must be able to criticise governments, challenge prevailing ideologies, question powerful institutions and discuss controversial questions without unreasonable fear of personal destruction. If only the wealthy and professionally secure can afford to speak freely, public debate becomes distorted in favour of those least vulnerable to retaliation.

The solution cannot be merely to encourage individuals to show greater courage. Courage is admirable, but a society should not require extraordinary heroism from ordinary citizens simply to exercise basic liberties. The law should protect freedom in ways that are accessible, predictable and effective before irreversible damage occurs.

Reiners's argument exposes the difference between freedom as a constitutional slogan and freedom as a practical social reality. A right that can be exercised only after years of expensive litigation is not a secure liberty for the average person. It is a legal possibility available most readily to those with sufficient resources to survive the consequences.

Britain's experience offers a warning to other Western democracies. Freedom of speech can be weakened without formally abolishing it. It can be undermined through uncertain laws, aggressive enforcement, professional pressure, costly litigation and regulatory incentives that encourage private censorship.

The ultimate test of a free society is not whether its courts occasionally vindicate courageous individuals after prolonged battles. It is whether ordinary people can express lawful opinions without reasonably fearing that doing so will destroy their livelihoods.

If speaking freely becomes an expensive legal gamble, then freedom of speech has ceased to be an ordinary civic right and has become, in practice, a privilege of the wealthy.

https://www.spiked-online.com/2026/11/11/how-britain-is-pricing-free-speech-out-of-citizens-reach/