Could Would-Be World Emperor Xi Jinping be Eating His Last Bowls of Noodles as Chinese President? By James Reed and Lee Wei Chan

Recent rumours, amplified by sources like the Spectator, suggest Xi Jinping's grip on power may be weakening, with some even speculating about his imminent removal. These claims stem from a combination of political, military, and economic signals that point to discontent within the CCP and broader Chinese society. However, the evidence is inconclusive, and Xi's history of consolidating power makes any immediate ouster unlikely. We will examine the key points fuelling the speculation and assess their validity.

The Spectator notes a "noticeable decline" in references to Xi as the "core" of the CCP or Central Military Commission (CMC) in outlets like People's Daily and People's Liberation Army Daily. These outlets have shifted from praising Xi's singular authority to emphasising "collective leadership," a term associated with Hu Jintao's era. This could signal a deliberate move to dilute Xi's cult of personality, which has been a cornerstone of his rule since 2012, with titles like "lingxiu" (leader) and "Xi Jinping Thought" enshrined in the CCP constitution.

The reappearance of Hu Jintao's catchphrases, like "scientific, democratic, and law-based decision-making," in state media suggests a possible comeback for the Communist Youth League (CYL) faction, which Xi sidelined at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Hu's dramatic removal from that congress, widely seen as a public humiliation orchestrated by Xi, makes this shift notable. Similarly, former Premier Wen Jiabao's reported "manoeuvres" hint at elders challenging Xi's dominance. The CYL faction, once a counterweight to Xi's loyalists, could be regaining influence amid discontent.

Xi's absence from high-level CMC meetings, with General Zhang Youxia taking his place, is unusual given the CMC chairmanship's centrality to Xi's power. The arrests of Xi's Fujian faction allies, like General He Weidong and Admiral Miao Hua, for "serious violations of discipline" (code for corruption or disloyalty) suggest internal resistance within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA's loyalty to the CCP, not the state, makes it a critical power base, and purges could indicate Xi's need to suppress rival centres of influence.

Xi's two-week absence from public view in late May 2025, followed by a low-key meeting with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko on June 4, raised eyebrows. The meeting's unusual setting (Xi's residence), lack of protocol, delayed reporting, and reliance on Belarusian media photos suggest something was off. Posts on X have speculated that Xi may already be a "nominal" leader, retaining only ceremonial roles.

Xi's zero-Covid policy, which led to catastrophic lockdowns in cities like Shanghai, eroded public trust and sparked rare protests in 2022, forcing a policy reversal. The post-Covid economic recovery has been weak, with a property crisis, high graduate unemployment, and provincial debt undermining Xi's legitimacy. Unpunished academic criticism of Xi's policies at top universities further hints at a loosening of his control.

Overseas commentators like Cai Shenkun and Chen Pokong claim CCP elders have decided Xi must step down, possibly at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee in late August 2025. They cite Xi's deteriorating health, a faltering economy, and international pressure as breaking points. Some suggest Xi could retain a ceremonial title like president while relinquishing real power as general secretary and CMC chairman.

Despite these signals, Xi's removal is far from certain. He has spent over a decade consolidating power, breaking norms to secure a third term in 2022, stacking the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) with loyalists like Li Qiang and Cai Qi, and abolishing presidential term limits in 2018. His anti-corruption campaigns have purged rivals, including CYL figures like Hu Chunhua and Ling Jihua, cementing his dominance. The PLA, while shaken by purges, remains under Xi's control through loyalists like Zhang Youxia.

Xi's "disappearances" are not new; he vanished for two weeks in 2012 amid health rumours, only to re-emerge unscathed. The CCP's opaque nature fuels speculation, but state media's health excuses for Hu Jintao's 2022 removal suggest Xi can control narratives. Even if factions oppose him, Xi's grip on the PSC and Central Secretariat makes a coup difficult. The lack of a clear successor, unlike Hu Jintao, who was groomed under Jiang Zemin, further entrenches Xi's position.

The rumours of Xi's demise are plausible but speculative. The shift to "collective leadership" rhetoric, military purges, and factional resurgence suggest internal pushback, possibly driven by economic woes and Covid policy failures. However, Xi's centralised power, loyalist-dominated PSC, and history of surviving challenges make an immediate ouster unlikely. The Spectator's claim that Xi's time may be up hinges on unverified sources and could reflect wishful thinking among China critics. If Xi is weakened, a "managed exit" preserving his dignity, as suggested by Cai Shenkun, is more likely than a dramatic purge.

Removing a leader like Xi Jinping in China's authoritarian system is extraordinarily difficult due to the CCP's structure, Xi's consolidation of power, and the absence of democratic mechanisms. Unlike democracies with elections or constitutional processes, the CCP operates through elite consensus, factional manoeuvring, and opaque power struggles. Below, we outline the potential mechanisms for removing a leader like Xi, based on historical precedent and the CCP's political dynamics.

Process: The CCP's top decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and the broader Politburo (24 members) or Central Committee (205 members) could theoretically force a leader out if a critical mass of elites agrees. This requires senior figures, elders, military leaders, or regional bosses, to unite against the leader, often citing policy failures or threats to party stability.

Historical Precedent: Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor, was sidelined in 1980-81 through Deng Xiaoping's manoeuvring, not a formal vote. Deng leveraged economic failures and factional support to install Hu Yaobang. Xi's removal could follow a similar path, with elders like Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao rallying the CYL faction.

Challenges: Xi's PSC is packed with loyalists, and his anti-corruption purges have decimated rival factions like the CYL. The Central Committee, while larger, is less influential and unlikely to act without PSC backing. Xi's control over the PLA further complicates a revolt, as military support is critical.

Process: The PLA, loyal to the CCP via the CMC, could play a kingmaker role if factions within the military turn against Xi. A disgruntled general or faction could stage a coup or pressure Xi to step down, especially if his policies (e.g., Taiwan aggression) risk military overreach.

Historical Precedent: No CCP leader has been removed by a military coup since 1949, but the PLA's role in upholding party power makes it a potential wildcard. The 1971 Lin Biao affair, where a top general allegedly plotted against Mao, shows the military's capacity for dissent, though it failed.

Challenges: Xi's purges of PLA figures like He Weidong and Miao Hua suggest he's pre-emptively neutralising threats. The CMC's structure, with Xi as chairman, ensures tight control. Any military move would risk destabilising the CCP, which prioritises unity.

Process: The CCP often cloaks power transitions in health-related excuses or face-saving retirements. Xi could be persuaded to step down due to "ill health," retaining a ceremonial role (e.g., president) while ceding real power as general secretary and CMC chairman. This avoids public humiliation and maintains party stability.

Historical Precedent: Hu Jintao's 2022 removal was officially attributed to health issues, though many suspect it was a purge. Deng Xiaoping retained influence as a retired elder, suggesting Xi could be sidelined similarly.

Challenges: Xi's cult of personality and lack of a clear successor make voluntary retirement unlikely unless forced by overwhelming elite pressure. His reported health issues could be exaggerated to justify a managed exit.

Process: Widespread public unrest, like the 2022 anti-lockdown protests, could embolden CCP elites to act against Xi if they perceive his leadership as a liability. Economic crises, like the property crash or graduate unemployment, could amplify this pressure.

Historical Precedent: The 1989 Tiananmen protests weakened then-General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who was purged for sympathising with protesters. However, the CCP's current surveillance and censorship capabilities make mass protests less likely to succeed.

Challenges: Xi's mass surveillance and censorship, strengthened since 2012, suppress dissent effectively. The CCP's fear of instability makes elites hesitant to act unless protests reach a critical scale.

Removing Xi would likely involve a combination of elite consensus and a face-saving narrative (e.g., health or retirement). The Fourth Plenary Session in August 2025, cited by Cai Shenkun, could be a venue for announcing a transition if elders and factions like the CYL gain traction. However, Xi's loyalist-dominated PSC, control over the PLA, and lack of a designated successor make this a tall order. The CCP's obsession with stability means any removal would be choreographed to avoid public chaos, possibly with Xi retaining a symbolic role.

If Xi were removed, the impact on Taiwan and US-China relations could be significant. A return to "collective leadership" might soften China's aggressive posture, including its "wolf warrior" diplomacy and Taiwan brinkmanship. A less confrontational leader could value economic recovery over military adventurism, easing tensions with the US and its allies, including Australia. However, the CCP's core goal of "national rejuvenation" by 2049, including Taiwan's "reunification," is unlikely to change. For Australia, a weakened or post-Xi China could reduce immediate threats but wouldn't eliminate the need for a robust defence strategy.

Is Xi Jinping's time up? Not yet, but the cracks are showing. Rumours of his weakening grip, fuelled by media shifts, factional resurgence, military purges, and economic discontent, suggest a real challenge to his authority, but his decade-long power consolidation makes an abrupt fall unlikely. Removal would likely require a rare alignment of CCP elders, military figures, and economic crises, executed through a managed, face-saving exit rather than a dramatic purge. For Australia, this underscores the urgency of reducing reliance on the US and pursuing independent deterrence, whether nuclear or otherwise, as argued at the blog today. Xi's potential downfall, if it happens, could buy time for regional stability, but the CCP's long-term ambitions mean Australia must prepare for a world where China remains a formidable challenge, with or without Xi.

The CCP's opacity makes definitive conclusions impossible, but the patterns noted are worth watching.

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/is-xi-jinpings-time-up/

"Is Chinese President Xi Jinping – the great architect of the Covid lockdowns – about to be defenestrated? Those are the rumours coming out of China – and the fallout from the crippling lockdowns is part of the reason. Francis Pike in the Spectator has more.

Is it a coincidence that the expunging of Xi Zhongxun [Xi Jinping's father] has come to light while Xi himself seemingly disappeared from public view in the last two weeks of May? Chinese institutions are always alert to changes in the political wind – no more so than the state media. Recently China-watchers have detected subtle changes. Xi, usually on every front page of the People's Liberation Army Daily, has been much less prominent. Shen Ming-Shih, a Director of the Institute for National Defence and Security Research in Taiwan, has observed "a noticeable decline in the official references to Xi".

In the past, Xi has been described as the "eternal core of the party". As recently as December, the People's Liberation Army Daily wrote that decisions should "rely on a single voice of authority". Now it praises the virtues of "collective leadership". In addition, Shen has pointed out that academics at Peking University and South China University of Technology have not been punished for writing essays critical of Xi's policies.

Remarkably, Hu Jintao, Xi's predecessor and faction opponent, who, in front of the world's press, was humiliatingly manhandled out of the CCP's 20th National Congress in October 2022 by Xi's bodyguards, seems to be making a comeback. On May 19th, the People's Daily and Xinhua News both published articles using Hu catchphrases that reference "scientific, democratic and law-based decision-making". Wen Jiabao, the supposedly billionaire former Chinese premier, is another elder who is reportedly on manoeuvres.

In May, the usual monthly politburo meeting did not take place. Furthermore, Xi has not been present at high-level meetings of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of which he is Chairman. His place has been taken by General Zhang, who is not a Xi faction member. CMC chairmanship is central to the power of a CCP General Secretary.

Uncertainty about the direction of the People's Liberation Army has contributed to the rumours of change in China's leadership. Hei Weidong, Vice-Chairman of the CMC and a member of Xi's Fujian faction, was suddenly arrested in April. Xi was governor of Fujian Province in the late 1990s. In November last year, another of Xi's Fujian clique, Admiral Miao Hua, who was head of the CMC's Political Work Department, was put under investigation for "serious violations of discipline" – the usual newspeak for corruption. On April 30th, he was dismissed. Other Xi generals have reportedly been removed from their posts.

In the realm of economic management there are also signs of discontent. It is widely recognised that Xi's repressive handling of the Covid pandemic was catastrophic. In the end it was public protest that forced him to end lockdown. By Chinese standards, post-Covid recovery has been anaemic. A property crash has destroyed consumer confidence and has also landed provincial governments with unsustainable levels of debt. Graduate unemployment has risen sharply. Many are fleeing to the West to find employment. …

Xi's two-week disappearance in May seemed to support the theory that he has already been frozen out. So, did his reappearance on June 4th when he met Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko lay to rest the rumours of his political demise? Quite the opposite. The meeting, which was abnormally held in Xi's house, was strangely subfusc and devoid of normal protocols. Reporting was delayed and brief and did not feature any quotations from the President. The press photographs were lifted from Belarusian media as though Chinese reporters and photographers were not allowed to be present. …

The demise of Xi has been predicted before and there can be no certainty that the recent waves of rumours are accurate. Even if they are true, it remains possible that Xi could stage a comeback and put his enemies to flight. However, given the dire problems facing China and the indifferent performance of its leader, it seems quite plausible that forces within the CCP have had enough of the dictatorial Xi, who, just two years ago, had presumptuously declared his intention to rule until 2032. If Xi falls, or indeed has already fallen, the consequences for Taiwan and US-China relations could be dramatic – and possibly beneficial to both.

If even Xi Jinping can be brought low in part due to the horrendous lockdown policy, it gives hope that such draconian shutdowns will be consigned to the past as a mistake never to be repeated. Even if the latest rumours turn out to be untrue, or exaggerated, it's clear that lockdowns have hurt Xi rather than bolstered his position in China – they are hardly being celebrated as a great success, more treated as something embarrassing to be quietly forgotten. Should the world ever again face a somewhat mysterious virus outbreak, surely politicians across the world will be more likely now to look back on the 2020s and think twice – and then some – before concluding the right response is to confine the population to their homes."