Could it Go Nuclear? When? By Richard Miller (London)

The article from American Thinker by J.B. Shurk is an opinion piece arguing that the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, now in its fifth year, carries a growing risk of nuclear escalation due to prolonged conflict driven by self-interested Western and European motives, combined with increasingly open discussions of nuclear options on multiple sides.

The core argument is that the war is being artificially extended not for humanitarian or territorial reasons, but for political, financial, and power-consolidation purposes (e.g., shielding Ukrainian leaders from scandals, weakening Putin, enabling EU military integration, funding defence industries via war bonds, and justifying austerity). This prolongation heightens the danger of the conflict spilling into a broader, potentially nuclear confrontation in Europe. The tone is alarmist and critical of Western leaders, while presenting Russian perspectives sympathetically (e.g., viewing the war as a defensive response to NATO expansion and 2014 events in Ukraine). It concludes with a plea: "Too many influential voices are contemplating how to 'win' a nuclear war. Say a prayer for peace."

Prolongation Risks: Stalled talks (e.g., recent Geneva trilateral discussions) over issues like Donbas sovereignty increase frustration. The author claims Western actions (sanctions, asset freezes, dismissing Russian views as disinformation) have backfired, fuelling Russian nationalism and shifting focus toward Asia.

Nuclear Rhetoric on the Western Side: Influential figures are openly discussing nuclear capabilities or proliferation:

oU.S. Senator Lindsey Graham: Nuclear deterrence requires willingness to use weapons.

oFrench President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz: Talks on a "continental nuclear shield."

oTurkish President Recep Erdogan: Expressing desire for nuclear weapons.

oPolish President Karol Nawrocki: Poland needs nukes against Russia.

Russian Side – Focus on Sergey Karaganov: The piece heavily features Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov (a prominent figure with ties to Putin and Lavrov) and his essay in Russia in Global Affairs. Karaganov argues the war has dragged on due to insufficient "active nuclear deterrence." He proposes limited but decisive nuclear strikes using operational-strategic weapons if the EU doesn't retreat, targeting "strategically important areas of Europe" and specifically "places where elites gather, including in nuclear states" to impose "personal risk" on Western governments. He sees Western Europe's "degenerated ruling classes" as the true threat (not just Ukraine), and nuclear use as the only way to "break" Europe's will, prevent a larger U.S.-Russia war, and even deprive France/UK of nukes (claiming they've forfeited the moral right). Preemptive action against any Western proliferation is justified.

The article doesn't delve into detailed technical fallout scenarios (e.g., radiation spread, winter effects, or casualty estimates) but implies catastrophic outcomes:

Nuclear strikes could "resolve the European problem" but at immense human cost, including mass casualties.

Targets aimed at elites/government centres in nuclear states (France, UK) risk direct retaliation, potentially spiralling into broader U.S.-Russia conflict.

It warns of a shift from decades of nuclear avoidance (built by U.S. and Soviet leaders) to casual contemplation of "winning" a nuclear war.

Broader fallout includes turning the war "even more catastrophic," with Europe facing existential threats from ignored historical warnings (e.g., Karaganov's 2013 prediction that Ukraine's EU/NATO integration would lead to war).

This piece aligns with conservative critiques of Western policy, emphasising Russian viewpoints and portraying escalation as a consequence of hubris or self-interest in the West. Broader 2026 analyses (from sources like Carnegie, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and think tanks) note ongoing nuclear risks tied to the war — e.g., New START's recent expiration (Feb 5, 2026), doctrinal shifts, and proliferation concerns — but many assess actual Russian nuclear use as unlikely, viewing threats more as deterrence or psychological pressure amid peace talks and battlefield dynamics. The war remains conventional, though with heightened rhetoric around energy attacks, infrastructure strikes, and security guarantees.

But that could change for the worst.

https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2026/02/the_war_in_ukraine_could_go_nuclear.html