Chinese Land Purchases Near AUKUS Ports: Australia’s National Security Blind Spot, By James Reed
Recent revelations about Chinese-linked companies acquiring land near Australian ports shortlisted for AUKUS submarine bases, have sparked alarm, highlighting what critics call a persistent naivety in Australia's approach to national security. An article from The Australian on July 18, 2025, details how firms tied to Shanghai businessman Wang Yongxin, allegedly connected to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) United Front Work Department, purchased commercial properties near Port Kembla and Newcastle, both potential sites for Australia's nuclear-powered submarine bases under the AUKUS pact. This development, coupled with ongoing concerns about the Chinese-owned lease of Darwin Port, suggests that Australia's national security framework, particularly its Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), may be failing to address strategic risks posed by foreign influence. As one X user remarked, "Australia never learns" when it comes to safeguarding its interests, a sentiment that resonates given the country's history of controversial foreign investments.
The purchases involve two significant sites:
Port Kembla: A 222,000-square-metre plot, formerly a copper smelter, was acquired in January 2025 by Port Kembla Group, a company directed by Wang Zhongdong, son of Wang Yongxin. The site is adjacent to Port Kembla, a leading candidate for the AUKUS east coast submarine base due to its deep channels and infrastructure.
Newcastle: A 70,000-square-metre property, less than 500 metres from Newcastle Port, was bought in late 2024 by Ausdragon Holdings Pty Ltd, initially directed by Wang Yongxin before ownership transferred to his daughter, Wang Rui.
Wang Yongxin, president of the Shanghai Xinyang Chamber of Commerce, is linked to these deals through family and business ties. The chamber, reportedly guided by the CCP's United Front Work Department, raises red flags about potential foreign influence. The United Front is known for its efforts to shape global opinion in Beijing's favour, often through ostensibly private organisations. Experts like Peter Jennings, former executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, warn that these acquisitions could serve as intelligence-gathering points for the CCP, especially given AUKUS's strategic importance. "China's No.1 intelligence target in Australia will be anything to do with AUKUS and nuclear submarines," Jennings noted.
The AUKUS pact, announced in 2021, aims to bolster Australia's defence with nuclear-powered submarines, countering China's growing naval dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Port Kembla and Newcastle are among three sites (alongside Brisbane) shortlisted in 2023 for a new east coast submarine base to house Royal Australian Navy (RAN) vessels and support U.S. and UK submarine rotations. The proximity of Chinese-linked properties to these ports raises concerns about surveillance, sabotage, or influence operations, especially as China has openly criticised AUKUS as a threat to regional stability.
The lack of transparency around whether these purchases were vetted by the FIRB is particularly troubling. The Treasury Department's silence on the matter, as reported by The Australian, fuels suspicions that Australia's foreign investment oversight is inadequate. Clive Hamilton, a professor of public ethics, emphasised the CCP's "extremely comprehensive" control over Chinese-linked organisations abroad, suggesting that such acquisitions are rarely purely commercial. Posts on X, such as those from @SkyNewsAust and @LaurynBahen, echo this alarm, warning of threats to Australia's sovereignty.
Australia's struggle with Chinese investment in strategic assets isn't new. In 2015, the Northern Territory leased Darwin Port to Landbridge, a Chinese company, for 99 years, a decision widely criticised as a security risk. Both major Australian parties vowed to reclaim control before the 2025 election, reflecting bipartisan concern. Yet, as Hamilton pointed out, allowing new Chinese-linked purchases near AUKUS ports while seeking to unwind the Darwin deal is inconsistent and perplexing. The Darwin case exposed gaps in Australia's security framework, with the FIRB and government failing to prioritise strategic interests over commercial ones. The Port Kembla and Newcastle acquisitions suggest these lessons haven't been fully absorbed.
Wang Zhongdong, director of Port Kembla Group, denied any United Front links, insisting the purchases were "purely commercial" investments in green energy and sustainable infrastructure. He described the projects as aligned with global ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) trends, citing initiatives like a "smart port service platform" and "circular economy system" unveiled at the 2025 Australia-China Environmental Protection Forum. However, the involvement of the Shanghai Xinyang Chamber of Commerce and the Australian Sichuan and Chongqing Chamber of Commerce, both with ties to Chinese government entities, undermines claims of independence. The CCP's history of using economic ventures to advance strategic goals, as noted in a 2024 CSIS report on China's port investments, casts doubt on purely commercial motives.
The acquisitions highlight three critical issues:
1.FIRB's Effectiveness: The FIRB's apparent failure to scrutinise these deals points to weaknesses in Australia's foreign investment oversight. A 2023 Guardian report noted similar concerns with the Darwin Port lease, suggesting systemic issues in balancing economic openness with security.
2.China's Maritime Strategy: China's global port investments, part of its Belt and Road Initiative, often serve dual commercial and military purposes. A 2024 Council on Foreign Relations report documented China's stakes in 115 active port projects worldwide, raising fears of intelligence-gathering capabilities near strategic sites like AUKUS ports.
3.AUKUS Vulnerabilities: The AUKUS program, costing up to $368 billion AUD, is a cornerstone of Australia's defence strategy. Any compromise near potential submarine bases could undermine deterrence against China's naval expansion, which includes over 370 vessels compared to the U.S.'s 300.
To address these risks, Australia could:
Strengthen FIRB Oversight: Mandate stricter reviews of foreign purchases near strategic sites, with clear criteria for rejecting deals linked to adversarial states.
Enhance Intelligence Coordination: Work with AUKUS partners to monitor CCP-linked activities near critical infrastructure, leveraging U.S. and UK expertise.
Reclaim Strategic Assets: Follow through on reclaiming Darwin Port and scrutinise existing foreign-owned assets near AUKUS sites.
Public Transparency: Disclose FIRB decisions on sensitive acquisitions to rebuild public trust and deter covert influence.
In conclusion, Australia's national security faces a test with these Chinese-linked land purchases near AUKUS ports. The country's history of underestimating strategic risks, from Darwin Port to now Port Kembla and Newcastle, suggests a troubling pattern of naivety, as critics on X and experts like Jennings and Hamilton argue. While Wang Zhongdong insists the deals are commercial, the CCP's track record and the United Front's involvement raise legitimate concerns. Australia's lucky streak in avoiding major security breaches may not hold forever. Strengthening oversight, prioritising strategic interests, and learning from past mistakes are critical to safeguarding AUKUS and national security.
"Companies controlled by the family of a Shanghai businessman with connections to the Chinese Communist Party's foreign influence arm have purchased two commercial properties located within port precincts earmarked for AUKUS submarine bases.
As Beijing ramps up pressure on Canberra to stop the Port of Darwin from being prised from Chinese hands, The Australian can reveal that Chinese businessman Wang Yongxin, president of the Shanghai Xinyang Chamber of Commerce, is tied to property deals at the Kembla and Newcastle ports.
The chamber has links to China's Communist Party and hosts party-related events, according to its WeChat channel, raising the spectre it is linked to the United Front – the Communist Party's organisational effort to turn opinion at home and abroad in Beijing's favour.
Both the Kembla and Newcastle ports were shortlisted by the Defence Department in 2023 for a future east coast submarine base that would serve as the home port for Royal Australian Navy nuclear-powered submarines and support allied visits from the UK and the US.
It is unclear whether the two acquisitions were subject to approval processes by the Foreign Investment Review Board, with the Treasury Department not responding to questions about the matter sent in early July.
Mr Wang's son and director of the company that purchased the Port Kembla site, Wang Zhongdong, said the acquisitions were "commercial investments" in green energy and emphatically denied any link to China's United Front Work Department.
At nearly 220,000sq m, the Port Kembla site – formerly home to a copper smelter – was acquired by Port Kembla Group in January and is located adjacent to the port.
As director, Wang Zhongdong's address is listed at a luxury apartment in the Crown Residences at Sydney's Barangaroo Tower One, according to ASIC records. Transfer documents value the property at more than $10.5m.
Port Kembla Group also lists businessman Jian Chen as a director, while Binggang Jiang, secretary-general of the Australia-China Environmental Protection Association, holds a 15 per cent stake. Wang Yongxin also serves as president of that association.
In addition, Mr Wang is connected to a 70,000sq m property in Newcastle, owned by Ausdragon Holdings Pty Ltd, which is located less than 500m from the port and was purchased late last year.
On the day the company was incorporated, Mr Wang was listed as its director, before he immediately transferred ownership to his daughter, Wang Rui, who remains the sole director. While serving as director, Mr Wang was registered to the Barangaroo apartment, and he retains directorship of a separate company, Newport International Investments Pty Ltd, at that same address.
Peter Jennings, a former executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said the port acquisitions were of "serious concern" and called on Canberra to scrap the deal if United Front links were confirmed. "China's No.1 intelligence target in Australia will be anything to do with AUKUS and nuclear submarines," he said.
"We've had lots of experience of having to … fight them away from the Osborne precinct in South Australia."
Mr Jennings said he would be "appalled" if the FIRB had greenlit the acquisitions. "This is how China operates and yet we just seem to be in this naive space where you know property purchases or businesses being purchased by Chinese companies are thought to be just commerce – those deals drive back to the interests and priorities of the Chinese Communist Party," he said.
The 222,000sq m site in Port Kembla, NSW, bought by Port Kembla Group in January. Picture: Supplied
The acquisition of the two sites was unveiled at the 2025 Australia-China Environmental Protection Forum held in June, an event hosted by the Australia-China Environmental Protection Association. The forum, under the auspices of environmental preservation, was used by Mr Wang to launch several projects at the sites, which were characterised as green energy investments that aligned with the objective of sustainable development.
That included a "smart port service platform" that would employ technology that "empowers the upgrade of Wollongong and Newcastle ports" and a "circular economy system", according to Chinese media reports of the event. Co-organisers of the event were the Shanghai Xinyang Chamber of Commerce and another group, the Australian Sichuan and Chongqing Chamber of Commerce, established "under the advocacy of the Sichuan Province and Chongqing Municipality Government", a report in the Sichuan Financial Daily said.
Clive Hamilton, an expert on China's influence in Australia and a professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt University, said Beijing exercised an "extremely comprehensive" level of influence over Chinese-linked associations and chambers of commerce overseas.
"Those who assume official roles in them are almost certainly linked in some way to United Front influence activity – it's just how the system works," he said. "Basically, the CCP does not permit Chinese organisations abroad to act independently.
"Why would you be acquiring the Port of Darwin back from a Chinese company with some doubtful links and allowing properties with close access to ports in Newcastle and Port Kembla to be put in the same position? It doesn't make sense at all."
Chinese-owned company Landbridge was granted a 99-year lease of Darwin Port in 2015, with the company insisting the CCP had no influence over its operations. Both major parties vowed before the May election to wrest control of the asset back into Australian hands.
Since the Shanghai Xinyang Chamber of Commerce was formed in 2015, Mr Wang has served as its president. It is among the thousands of local chambers of commerce across China that are affiliated with the United Front Work Department.
In establishing the chamber, the United Front, the Xinyang municipal party committee and municipal government provided "careful guidance and assistance to the organisation", according to Chinese media, while its registration is authorised by Shanghai's Civil Affairs Bureau, an arm of the Shanghai municipal government.
Wang Zhongdong said neither his family nor any directors and shareholders had "any links whatsoever to China's United Front Work Department".
"Our business operations are entirely independent and privately funded," he said, describing the acquisition of the properties at Port Kembla and Newcastle as "purely a commercial investment" undertaken via "legitimate market channels" and for "business purposes only".
"These projects are focused on sustainable infrastructure, environmental technology deployment, and green logistics development aligned with broader global ESG trends," he said."
Comments