Australia’s Role in a US-China War: Insights from Paul Dibb and the Strategic Significance of Pine Gap, By James Reed and Paul Walker
Australia's strategic position in the Indo-Pacific has never been more critical, as tensions between the United States and China continue to shape global security dynamics. Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb AM, a leading voice at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, has long emphasised the complexities of Australia's role in this great power contest. With a distinguished career spanning roles as Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence in the Department of Defence and Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation, Dibb's insights carry significant weight. His work, including the seminal 1986 Dibb Report and the 1987 Defence White Paper, has shaped Australia's defense policy for decades. This blog piece explores Australia's likely involvement in a potential US-China conflict, with a focus on the strategic importance of the Pine Gap facility and the risks of nuclear targeting, drawing on Dibb's perspectives and recent developments.
Australia's deep military alliance with the United States, cemented through the ANZUS treaty and enhanced by the AUKUS pact, positions it as a key player in any US-China conflict. Acting Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles recently stated at The Australian's Defending Australia summit that Australia would "inevitably be drawn into" such a conflict, given its strategic relevance in the Indo-Pacific. This sentiment echoes Dibb's long-standing views on Australia's geopolitical alignment. In a 2015 statement, Dibb noted that while Australia does not face a direct invasion risk from China, it must prepare for involvement in conflicts driven by its alliance with the US, including potential efforts to disrupt China's trade routes.
Dibb's analysis underscores Australia's role as a critical hub for US military operations. The presence of over 2,000 US Marines in Darwin, nuclear-capable B-52 bombers at bases like Tindal, and the planned operation of US nuclear-powered submarines from Western Australia by 2027 all deepen this integration. Former Defence Department secretary Dennis Richardson reinforced this at the summit, stating that facilities like Pine Gap and the dispersal of US forces across Australia would make neutrality impossible in a US-China war, particularly over Taiwan.
At the heart of Australia's strategic vulnerability lies the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap, near Alice Springs. As a US-Australian intelligence hub, Pine Gap is critical for surveillance, missile early warning, and targeting coordination. Dibb, who oversaw Australia's policy on Pine Gap during his tenure as Deputy Secretary, has highlighted its role in US intelligence operations, including support for nuclear targeting. Analyses by experts like Peter Cronau, describe Pine Gap as the US's "most important surveillance base" in a potential nuclear war with China, making it a prime target for retaliatory strikes.
The facility's role in monitoring China's nuclear capabilities and supporting US command and control elevates its strategic value, and risk. A nuclear strike on Pine Gap would have catastrophic consequences, with a ground blast causing widespread radioactive fallout and civilian casualties in central Australia. While Dibb has not explicitly predicted such an attack in recent public statements, his broader warnings about the deteriorating security environment align with concerns about Pine Gap's vulnerability. In a 2018 speech at ANU, Dibb argued that Australia's international security outlook is "starting to look very threatening," citing tensions over Taiwan and China's growing military presence in the region.
Admiral David Johnston, Chief of the Defence Force, warned at the summit that Chinese naval exercises near Australia, including live-fire drills and circumnavigations, are likely to become more frequent. These activities, which some experts interpret as rehearsals for targeting Australian infrastructure, signal China's intent to project power in the Indo-Pacific. Dibb's earlier work, including his 2019 article in The Australian, emphasised the risks of a "new cold war" with China, particularly over Taiwan. He has advocated for a radically new defence policy to address these threats, focusing on capabilities to deter and respond to regional aggression.
Australia's trade routes, vital for its economic survival, are particularly vulnerable. Dibb has noted that in a conflict, decisions about maintaining these routes would likely be made by foreign powers, leaving Australia with limited control. This vulnerability, combined with China's expanding blue-water navy, underscores the need for robust defense preparedness, as Dibb has consistently argued.
Dibb's 1986 Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities stressed self-reliance within the context of the US alliance, a principle that remains relevant. However, recent debates highlight tensions over defence spending and capabilities. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has called for Australia to increase defence spending to 3.5% of GDP, far above the current 2%. Marles, echoing Dibb's capability-driven approach, has resisted arbitrary targets, with new funding decisions deferred to 2026. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review, which Dibb has indirectly influenced through his decades of work, provides a blueprint but requires significant investment, potentially exceeding 3% of GDP, as Richardson noted.
The AUKUS submarine program, a cornerstone of Australia's future deterrence, faces challenges. Dibb's focus on strategic preparedness aligns with concerns about delays in US submarine production and Australia's shortage of skilled engineers (an estimated 60,000 needed over the next decade). Former ambassador Joe Hockey suggested Australia could mitigate this by contributing to US submarine manufacturing, but the potential acquisition of Australian shipbuilder Austal by Korea's Hanwha raises concerns about domestic capacity.
Former Home Affairs secretary Michael Pezzullo stressed the need for greater public transparency about the consequences of Australia's US alignment. Dibb, too, has called for open discourse, as seen in his 2018 ANU speech urging a radically new defence policy. The risk of nuclear targeting at Pine Gap, while not directly attributed to Dibb in recent sources, is a recurring concern in public sentiment, as reflected in X posts advocating for the facility's closure to reduce Australia's exposure, a completely wrong approach in these dangerous times.
China's "no first use" nuclear policy suggests a high threshold for nuclear strikes, but Pine Gap's role in US nuclear operations could make it an exception. Dibb's work on Soviet nuclear strategy in his 1986 book The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower provides a historical parallel, highlighting the risks of escalation when critical intelligence facilities are involved. Australia must balance its alliance commitments with the need to prepare its public for potential consequences. The freedom movement has not yet discussed the ramifications of a nuclear attack upon Australia.
Paul Dibb's decades of expertise underscore Australia's precarious position in a potential US-China conflict. As a key US ally hosting critical facilities like Pine Gap, Australia is deeply integrated into American strategic plans, making involvement in a conflict over Taiwan or other flashpoints almost certain. The risk of nuclear targeting at Pine Gap, while not explicitly predicted by Dibb, aligns with his broader warnings about the deteriorating security environment and the need for a robust defense posture.
Australia's path forward requires balancing its alliance obligations with strategic autonomy, as Dibb has long advocated. The government's focus on AUKUS, defence reforms, and capability-driven spending reflects this approach, but challenges like US production delays and domestic skill shortages must be addressed. Public transparency, as Dibb and Pezzullo have emphasised, is crucial to preparing Australians for the risks ahead, including the sobering possibility of nuclear retaliation.
Acting Prime Minister Richard Marles says the nation will inevitably be drawn into a US-China conflict with the continent now more relevant than ever to the contest between the world's great powers, as America ratchets up its military presence on Australian soil.
The stark warning came as the Chief of the Defence Force David Johnston said Australians needed to prepare for more regular Chinese naval exercises off the nation's coastline, as Beijing's powerful navy hones its war plans.
Forty-eight hours before Anthony Albanese's meeting with Donald Trump in Canada, Mr Marles defended the government's refusal to announce fresh military spending in line with US demands, saying new funding decisions would not be made until next year.
At the same time, the Defence Minister flagged reforms to his department reforms that would put "everything on the table", and the upcoming sale of billions of dollars worth of surplus Defence land to raise funds for critical capabilities.
Mr Marles said while Australia was not under threat of invasion by China, it would play a key role if war broke out between the US and China. "Our continent is more relevant to great power contest now than it's ever been before," he told The Australian's Defending Australia summit in Canberra on Monday.
"That is as much of a question in the here and now as is the building up of our defence capability."
The comment came days after the Prime Minister refused to say whether China presented a military threat to Australia, and followed last year's declaration by the former head of the US Congress' foreign affairs committee, Michael McCaul, that Australia had become America's "central base of operations" in the Indo-Pacific.
Australia regularly hosts nuclear-capable US bombers from Top End bases, which have been expanded and hardened to meet American requirements, and is home to joint US-Australian defence facilities at Pine Gap and Exmouth. More than 2000 US Marine Corp personnel are also based in Darwin for six months a year, while US nuclear submarines will begin to operate from Western Australia by 2027.
Former Defence Department secretary Dennis Richardson told the summit that if the US and China went to war over Taiwan, Australia would be unable to avoid being dragged into the conflict.
"Whether it be Pine Gap, whether it be the disbursement of US forces, we would be involved," Mr Richardson said.
Former Home Affairs secretary Michael Pezzullo told the summit he was a supporter of closer military integration between Australia and the US, but the government needed to be more open with the public about the consequences of the relationship.
He said if Australia was attacked in the context of a US-China war, we would not be "sitting back saying: 'well, we rented them the space, we don't know what the tenants are doing with the land that we've given them'. We need to think much more deeply about this question."
Admiral Johnston, who last week warned the ADF might need to conduct combat operations from Australian soil, told the summit that last year's live-fire drills and circumnavigation of Australia by a Chinese naval flotilla was not a one-off event.
"As an expanding blue-water navy, we should expect the Chinese navy to undertake similar deployments more regularly to the South West, Pacific and Indian Ocean," Admiral Johnston said.
"These deployments are opportunities to expand their training, improve their operational readiness and demonstrate their increasing capability."
Defence experts warned that the Chinese warships used the mission to rehearse the targeting of Australian cities. Mr Marles said he was "very clear" about what the ships were doing, but it was not "appropriate or helpful" to reveal further detai NEXT
A fortnight after US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth called for Australia to lift defence spending to 3.5 per cent of GDP from its current 2 per cent, Mr Marles backed Mr Albanese's argument that military funding should be determined on the basis of required capabilities, not an arbitrary percentage of national output. He said next year's update of the national defence strategy would determine what new capabilities would be brought into service and make fresh decisions on spending.
Mr Pezzullo said the government already had a detailed spending blueprint – the 2023 Defence Strategic Review. "It just needs to be fully funded," he said.
Mr Richardson said if the government followed the recommendations of its own DSR, "it's going to take you north of 3 per cent of GDP".
Mr Marles said the upcoming overhaul of the Defence bureaucracy would ensure it was fit for purpose, while the Defence Estate Audit – handed to the government more than 18 months ago – would be released in due course, freeing up billions of dollars worth of land for much-needed spending. Quoting from the report, he said: "Defence is constrained by the weight of its past when it comes to management of the estate
"Urgent interventions are needed to correct the unsustainable trajectory that has resulted from decades of deferred decisions on contentious estate issues."
Days after the Trump administration announced an "America First" review of the AUKUS submarine pact, Australian Submarine Agency head Jonathan Mead said he had been assured by counterparts in Washington DC three weeks ago that they were confident Australia had the program in hand.
"We presented the evidence and showed them pictures … and once again they said to us, 'We understand, you're on track, we support this'," Admiral Mead told the summit.
Retired Rear Admiral Katherine Richards, chief engineer at Engineers Australia, warned the nation faced dire skills challenges that could set back the program, with an extra 60,000 engineers required over the next decade.
Former ambassador to the US, Joe Hockey, said the "ulterior motive" for the snap AUKUS review was America's own failure to produce enough Virginia-class submarines, which had led to second thoughts about supplying three of the boats to Australia.
"Our solution has to be actually, 'We're going to help you build them. We'll send … 500 people from Adelaide over there, and then we will build … command modules. We'll build torpedoes in Adelaide," Mr Hockey said.
He warned one of the biggest domestic threats to AUKUS was Korean defence giant Hanwha's push to buy out Australian shipbuilder Austal, which he said would undermine the nation's capacity to deliver the program.
Admiral Johnston said the "Pillar 1" submarine program was Defence's "primary capability priority."
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