Australia’s China Grovellers: A Dangerous Misstep Rooted in 1970s Asianisation Nostalgia, By James Reed
Australia's foreign policy debate is mired in a dangerous anachronism, with some commentators and policymakers clinging to a 1970s worldview that misjudges the contemporary threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As David Llewellyn-Smith argues, those who advocate for an independent Australian stance cozying up to China while distancing from traditional allies like the United States, are stuck in a bygone era. Their approach ignores the seismic shifts in global geopolitics and risks leaving Australia vulnerable to CCP influence. This nostalgia for a less threatening China, coupled with a reluctance to bolster defence and maintain strong alliances, is a recipe for a CCP takeover without a shot being fired.
In the 1970s, then-Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser proposed a quadrilateral pact with China, the U.S., Japan, and Australia to counter Soviet ambitions. This bold initiative, taken without prior approval from Washington, reflected a pragmatic yet independent Australian foreign policy in a world where China was a weaker player, tentatively exploring liberalisation. At the time, China lacked the military or economic clout to project power beyond its borders, and there was hope that political openness might follow its economic reforms. The Sydney Sun's criticism of Fraser for going "all the way with Hua" (Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng) was a quaint rebuke in an era when China could barely muster "three junks to Sydney," let alone a nuclear-capable flotilla.
Today's China is a different beast. With a navy boasting over 370 ships, including advanced missile frigates capable of threatening major cities, and a "no limits" partnership with Russia, the CCP poses a direct strategic challenge to Australia's security. The 1970s analogy, championed by China grovellers, ignores this reality. Unlike the China of Hua Guofeng, Xi Jinping's regime is authoritarian, expansionist, and aligned with adversarial powers. To treat modern China as a benign partner requiring only economic engagement is to misread its ambitions and capabilities.
China grovellers advocate for a foreign policy that prioritises trade with China, Australia's largest market, while resisting U.S. pressure for increased defence spending and downplaying the ANZUS alliance. They frame Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's private lunch with Xi Jinping and his reluctance to align too closely with U.S. President Donald Trump, as a continuation of Australia's tradition of independence. Yet, this approach misjudges the current geopolitical landscape. China's economic leverage over Australia, with $250 billion in annual trade, is undeniable, but leaning into this dependency while neglecting defence and alliances is a perilous gamble.
Critics like John Lee, Greg Sheridan, and Peter Jennings,argue for a more robust stance. They point to the Morrison government's "drums of war" rhetoric as a necessary wake-up call to China's growing assertiveness, from its militarisation of the South China Sea to its coercive trade tactics against Australia in 2020. While their tone may alarm some sheeple, their concerns are grounded in evidence: China's defence budget, at $225 billion in 2024, dwarfs Australia's $36 billion, and its strategic alignment with Russia signals a broader challenge to the Western-led order.
Llewellyn-Smith invokes Malcolm Fraser to highlight the folly of the grovellers' approach. Fraser, a Cold War sceptic of the Soviet Union, was a staunch advocate of strong defence, increasing Australia's military spending by 0.5% of GDP during his tenure while cutting overall budgets. He championed the ANZUS alliance as a cornerstone of Australia's security, even as he pursued independent initiatives like the quadrilateral pact. Were Fraser leading today, he would likely recognise the CCP's threat, its military build-up, cyberattacks, and influence operations in Australia, and prioritise defence and alliances over economic appeasement.
The grovellers' vision, embracing China while undermining ANZUS and keeping defence spending at a modest 2.1% of GDP, stands in stark contrast. Australia's defence capabilities, including its delayed AUKUS submarine program and underfunded air force, are ill-equipped to counter a CCP that could, in a worst-case scenario, target multicultural Sydney with hypersonic missiles. Fraser's pragmatism would reject this complacency, recognising that strategic independence requires military strength, not just diplomatic gestures.
China's influence in Australia extends beyond trade. Its Belt and Road investments, control of critical infrastructure like Darwin Port, and infiltration of academic and political spheres have raised alarms about foreign interference. The CCP's "no limits" partnership with Russia, formalized in 2022, aligns it with a power that shares its anti-Western agenda, amplifying the threat to Australia's Indo-Pacific interests. Meanwhile, domestic policies like the Albanese government's push for "more, not less" trade with China, as stated by Trade Minister Don Farrell, risk deepening economic dependence at a time when decoupling is gaining traction globally.
The grovellers' dismissal of these concerns as "catastrophising" ignores the CCP's track record of coercion. In 2020, China imposed $20 billion in trade sanctions on Australian exports like barley and wine, retaliating against Canberra's call for a COVID-19 origins inquiry. This economic warfare, coupled with cyberattacks attributed to Chinese state actors, underscores the need for a robust defence posture and reliable alliances, not a return to 1970s-style engagement.
Australia can maintain its foreign policy independence without grovelling to China. Strengthening the ANZUS alliance and deepening ties with AUKUS partners (the U.S. and UK) and Quad nations (India, Japan) would provide strategic ballast against CCP aggression. Increasing defence spending to 3% of GDP, as Fraser might have advocated, could fund critical capabilities like missile defence systems and cyber warfare units. Simultaneously, diversifying trade partners, such as India and Southeast Asia, would reduce reliance on China without isolating it entirely.
Engaging China diplomatically remains necessary, but it must be clear-eyed, not nostalgic. Albanese's lunch with Xi may signal openness, but without a strong defence and alliance framework, it risks projecting weakness. Australia should also leverage its Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network to counter Chinese influence operations, ensuring domestic resilience against external pressures.
The China grovellers' fixation on a 1970s worldview, where China was a weak, reforming nation and Australia could flirt with independence without consequences, is dangerously outdated. Today's CCP is a military and economic powerhouse with global ambitions and a track record of coercion. By advocating for deeper trade ties while downplaying defence and alliances, figures like Albo risk leaving Australia exposed to a CCP takeover "without a shot being fired." Malcolm Fraser's legacy of pragmatic strength offers a better path: a robust defence, strong alliances, and a foreign policy that balances engagement with vigilance. Australia must shed its 1970s nostalgia and confront the realities of 2025 to secure its future. China really is a threat.
https://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2025/07/china-grovellers-stuck-in-the-70s/
China grovellers are stuck in the 70s
One of Australia's leading China grovellers, James Curran, simply can't break out of the 1970s.
In his talks with then-Chinese premier Hua Guofeng, Fraser had proposed the formation of a quadrilateral pact – comprising China, the US, Japan and Australia – to hedge against Soviet ambitions in the Pacific and Indian oceans. It never eventuated. But the point was that an Australian leader had proposed an independent initiative without checking with Washington first.
The Sydney Sun newspaper thought Fraser had gone "all the way with Hua" and frowned on the prime minister for calling into question "our dealings with traditional connections in Washington, London and Europe".
…The prime minister knows that today's world is not some kind of cartoonish game. He knows that most, if not all countries in the region are still balancing in some kind of way: wary of China, leery of US President Donald Trump. Though Australian officials would no doubt have briefed their Five Eyes counterparts and Japan prior to the China visit, Canberra does not need to seek permission to run its own foreign policy either, nor apologise for growing its biggest market.
But it appears that the alternative being demanded by some critics, such as John Lee, Greg Sheridan and Peter Jennings, is a return to the "drums of war" rhetoric characteristic of the Morrison years. The catastrophising over Albanese's lack of a meeting with Trump and the fretting over his private lunch with Chinese President Xi Jinping betrays the very mindset Peacock critiqued.
…To Washington, the prime minister has sent a reminder of that tradition in Australian foreign policy where Canberra, knowing that great powers often play fast and loose with this country's interests, can express its independence both within and without the alliance. So Albanese stands firm on American demands for greater defence spending, just as Trade Minister Don Farrell is emphatic on Australia wanting to do "more, not less" business with China.
These China grovellers are addicted to 1970s analogues even though they are wildly wrong.
In the 1970s, China could not have sailed three junks to Sydney, let alone a flotilla of nuclear-capable missile frigates rehearsing the annihilation of our largest city.
In the 1970s, as China mulled an embrace of liberalisation, there was every reason to expect political loosening would come with it.
We can't say that today unless we have our eyes closed.
To demonstrate, I ask you, how would Cold War warrior Malcom Fraser be handling today's China?
Fraser was a deep Soviet skeptic and would not have been impressed with China's "no limits" alliance with the former USSR.
He was also a pragmatist, so it is unlikely he would have gone entirely the other way.
But what Fraser would have done today that the China grovellers do not is recognise the imminence of the threat the CCP now poses.
Fraser was an advocate of strong defence spending, lifting it by a half percentage point of GDP during his tenure whilst cutting wider spending.
There is no way known that a Fraser government today would be running down defence whilst distancing Australia from ANZUS.
Likewise, in power, Fraser was a strong advocate of ANZUS. Later in life, he became more skeptical, but even then, he advocated much higher defence spending to support the notion of Australian strategic independence.
The China grovellers these days want Australia to trash ANZUS whilst embracing China and keeping defence spending low.
This is a recipe for CCP takeover without a shot being fired."
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