In the words of H.L. Mencken, "for every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong." For decades, UK politicians, like Australia's, have peddled mass immigration as a silver bullet for the nation's looming pension crisis, claiming it will prop up an aging population and sustain the welfare state. Yet, as the UK faces a demographic crunch, with 22.7 million people drawing benefits by 2040 against only 34 million workers, this solution is increasingly exposed as flawed. The evidence is clear: immigration cannot fix the pension system due to fertility convergence, limited economic contributions, and social costs that outweigh the benefits. Instead, structural reforms, inspired by models like Sweden's notional defined-contribution plan or Singapore's Central Provident Fund, offer a sustainable path forward. This discussion dismantles the myth of immigration as a pension saviour, with the UK as a case study.
The UK's State Pension operates on a "pay-as-you-go" model, where current tax revenues fund retirees' pensions rather than a dedicated savings pool. This system, likened to a Ponzi scheme, relies on a steady stream of workers to support an ever-growing retiree population. But Britain's demographics are shifting alarmingly. By 2042, the old-age dependency ratio will reach 367 pensioners per 1,000 working-age adults, up from 280 in 2020, according to Office for National Statistics (ONS) projections. The Adam Smith Institute warns the pension system could become insolvent by 2036, with tax rates potentially exceeding 60% to maintain solvency. By 2040, 22.7 million people, mostly pensioners, will draw benefits, straining a workforce of just 34 million. This imbalance demands a solution, but immigration falls short for two critical reasons: fertility convergence and lifetime net contributions.
Proponents of mass immigration argue that young migrants boost the workforce and birth rates, offsetting an aging population. However, this ignores fertility convergence. First-generation migrants may have higher birth rates, Somali women in Norway, for example, average seven children in Somalia but drop to two by the second generation, per a 2018 Demography study. In the UK, Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities show some resistance to this trend due to cultural norms and spousal immigration, with fertility rates around 2.9 compared to the national 1.6, per ONS data. Yet, even these groups trend toward native norms over time.
The ONS concedes that higher migration only delays the rise in dependency ratios, not prevents it. A 2023 ONS report modelling zero to high migration scenarios (0 to 300,000 net migrants annually) found that the old-age dependency ratio will climb regardless, reaching 49% by 2070 under high migration. To sustain pensions, the UK would need perpetual waves of working-age migrants, an unsustainable pyramid scheme that ignores integration challenges and public consent. Immigration merely kicks the demographic can down the road, failing to address the structural flaw of pay-as-you-go financing.
The second flaw is the economic reality: most migrants are not net contributors to public finances. A 2023 Centre for Policy Studies analysis of skilled-worker visa holders (2022–23) found 72% earn below the UK's average salary (£33,000), with 54% earning less than half (£16,500). Of 333,000 visas issued, 242,000 went to low-wage workers versus 91,000 to high-wage earners. Dependents, who often don't work, further strain resources. Only 12% of recent visas were for skilled workers, and an even smaller fraction for high-skilled roles that significantly boost tax revenue. A 2024 UCL study estimated that non-EU migrants' lifetime net fiscal contribution is negative, costing £151,000 per person when factoring in public services like healthcare and education.
Far from bolstering the Treasury, low-wage migrants and dependents draw heavily on public funds. The Migration Advisory Committee (2025) notes that low-skilled migration increases pressure on housing, NHS services, and schools, with costs outweighing tax contributions. High-skilled migrants, like doctors or engineers, could help, but they're a minority, only 15% of visas target such roles. The narrative that immigration will "pay for pensions" ignores this maths, leaving taxpayers to foot the bill.
Beyond economics, mass immigration's social toll undermines its viability as a solution. Rapid demographic change has strained community cohesion, with a 2024 Telegraph poll showing 62% of Britons feel immigration has altered their towns without consent. The Rotherham grooming scandal, where 1,400 girls were abused by gangs between 1997 and 2013, exposed how authorities ignored crimes to avoid "racism" accusations, fostering resentment and division. Recent allegations of police complicity in Rotherham further erode trust, highlighting the risks of prioritising optics over accountability. These social fractures, ghettoisation, alienation, and rising crime, make immigration a divisive fix, not a unifying one.
The UK's pension crisis demands structural reform, not immigration Band-Aids. Two models offer inspiration:
1.Sweden's Notional Defined-Contribution Plan: Introduced in the 1990s, Sweden's system ties pensions to individual contributions, with workers and employers paying into accounts that grow based on wage or GDP growth. At retirement, these convert into pensions adjusted for life expectancy. This eliminates intergenerational dependency, ensuring solvency despite demographic shifts. A 2025 OECD report praises Sweden's system, with pension spending at 7% of GDP versus the UK's 8.1% and rising.
2.Singapore's Central Provident Fund (CPF): This fully funded system mandates high savings rates, up to 37% of wages in youth, tapering with age, covering retirement, healthcare, and housing. Retirees draw on their own savings, keeping pension costs low at 1.4% of GDP, per a 2024 World Bank study. The CPF's mandatory contributions ensure fairness and resilience, unlike the UK's fragile pay-as-you-go model.
Transitioning to either system would require political will and a phased approach, raising contribution rates, adjusting benefits, and educating the public. A 2023 Economist analysis estimates a 10-year transition could stabilise UK pensions, saving £100 billion annually by 2050. Unlike immigration, these reforms address the root issue: funding pensions without relying on an ever-growing workforce.
Advocates of immigration argue it boosts GDP and fills labour gaps, citing Canada's high-migration model. But Canada's 2025 immigration cuts, driven by housing and unemployment crises, show the limits of this approach. In the UK, GDP growth from migration (2% annually, per ONS) masks per capita stagnation, as low-wage migrants strain services. High-skilled migration could help, but visa policies prioritise quantity over quality, with only 5% of migrants in high-tax-bracket roles. Social cohesion, already frayed, cannot withstand perpetual high inflows, as seen in public backlash and rising, understandable far-Right sentiment on X.
Mass immigration is a clear, simple, and wrong answer to the UK's pension crisis. Fertility convergence ensures migrants age into the problem, while low net contributions burden taxpayers. Social costs, division, crime, and eroded trust, further discredit the model, as seen in scandals like Rotherham. Britain must reject this failed fix and embrace pension reform, drawing on Sweden's or Singapore's proven systems. These demand courage but promise solvency and fairness, freeing the UK from the lie that immigration can save pensions. It's time to stop kicking the can and build a future where each generation funds its own retirement.
https://thecritic.co.uk/mass-migration-will-not-solve-the-pensions-crisis/
"In the words of 20th century essayist H. L. Mencken, "for every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong." For decades, mass migration has been the clear, simple, and wrong answer presented by politicians to every complex problem in British life.
Yet despite the fact that the economic and social disadvantages of the mass migration model are now abundantly clear, self-proclaimedly sensible commentators continue to insist that this failed approach is the only way to keep our unsustainable pension system on life support.
First, a few hard truths. The UK State Pension is funded from current tax revenues, rather than from money set aside in a dedicated pot built up over the course of a person's working life. This "pay-as-you-go" ponzi scheme relies on future generations of workers to fund pensions for retirees, which becomes unsustainable as the population ages and the ratio of workers to pensioners shrinks, which is exactly what's happening in the UK.
In fact, by 2040 there will be 22.7 million people drawing benefits (mostly pensions), versus only 34 million people working to fund it. The Adam Smith Institute has calculated that the State pension could become insolvent as soon as 2036.
And by 2042, the old-age dependency ratio will climb to 367 pensioners per 1000 working-age, likely requiring tax rates north of 60 per cent just to stand still.
So what's the solution? Proponents of mass migration claim that new arrivals will prop up the tax base. It is an attractively simple idea. But there are two fundamental flaws in the argument: fertility convergence and lifetime net contributions.
First, while first‑generation migrants often have higher birth rates, subsequent generations rapidly adopt native fertility norms. Research on immigrant women in Norway shows Somalis go from an average of seven children per woman in Somalia to around two children by the second generation in Norway.
There is some evidence to suggest that certain immigrant groups are more resistant to native fertility norms than others, namely Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in the UK. This may be partly because of sustained migration from these countries, especially through spousal immigration, which reinforces their cultural norms favoring early marriage and larger families in the UK.
But the ONS concedes that higher migration will only artificially improve dependency ratios; it "will not prevent" an aging population. Even if we consider different migration scenarios (from zero to high net migration into the UK), the old-age dependency ratio will continue to increase. This means that mass migration could only be the solution to the pension crisis if we permanently imported working age migrants to the UK, forever.
Brits can no longer afford the lie that mass migration will salvage pensions
Second, the vast majority of migrants are not net contributors over their lifetimes. A Centre for Policy Studies analysis of 2022–23 skilled‑worker visa holders found that 72 per cent earn below the UK's average salary, and 54 per cent earn less than half the average. Extrapolating, that means roughly 242,000 visas went to "low‑wage" migrants versus just 91,000 to high‑wage earners. And that's before counting dependents, who often don't contribute at all. Overall, only 12 per cent of visas issued in recent years were through the skilled worker route, with a fraction going to higher skilled migrants who could contribute positively to public finances. Far from bolstering the Treasury, most migrants draw on public services, leaving British taxpayers to pick up the tab.
This is not to mention the social and cultural downsides of mass migration. Communities in Britain are being changed without consent, leading to ghettoisation, alienation, and resentment. In dozens of towns across the country, authorities have ignored rape gangs for fear of seeming racist. The rape gang scandal is perhaps the most egregious example of how mass migration has damaged our social fabric, but with each passing day, mass migration continues to create a country which is less safe and more divided.
The only genuine solution is to restructure how pensions are funded, and to do so by learning from those who have already succeeded.
In the 1990s, Sweden shifted its state pension to a notional defined-contribution plan. Workers and employers contribute a percentage of wages into an account that grows based on wage or GDP growth rates. At retirement, this total converts into a pension paid at regular intervals, adjusted for life expectancy.
Singapore's Central Provident Fund (CPF) is a fully funded, compulsory savings system. Both employees and employers contribute to an account over a worker's career. These funds earn a government-set return and serve as retirement income, covering healthcare and housing needs.
Crucially, each generation funds its own retirement without the intergenerational dependency which characterises the UK system. Singapore's system mandates one of the world's highest savings rates, up to 37 per cent of wages in youth, tapering with age, ensuring most retirees are supported by their accumulated assets. CPF keeps pension spending remarkably low, with pension expenditure around 1.4 per cent of GDP, primarily for means-tested top-ups, compared to as much as 16.5 per cent across Europe.
The UK could and should transition to either model. These reforms demand real political courage, but the payoff is a pension framework that is solvent, intergenerationally fair, and robust against demographic change. Brits can no longer afford the lie that mass migration will salvage pensions. Instead of kicking the demographic can down the road, it's time to overhaul the pension system."