There is a pattern that keeps repeating itself across Western democracies, and it is more unsettling than ordinary political failure. Large numbers of people continue to vote for parties and leaders whose policies demonstrably harm their economic security, cultural cohesion, physical safety, and long-term prospects. The harm is not subtle. It shows up in stagnant wages, unaffordable housing, declining trust, rising crime in certain areas, energy poverty, and a sense that the country is being managed for someone else's benefit. And yet the same voters return, election after election, to the architects of the damage.
At some point the ordinary explanations, ignorance, short-termism, media bias, the lesser-of-two-evils trap, begin to feel incomplete. What we are watching looks less like rational choice and more like a form of learned attachment to the source of harm.
Stockholm syndrome describes the psychological bond that can form between captives and their captors. The captive begins to identify with the person who holds power over them, to rationalise the abuse, and even to defend the abuser against outsiders. Battered wife syndrome describes a similar dynamic in intimate relationships: the victim stays, minimises the violence, blames herself, and often rejects offers of rescue because the relationship, however destructive, has become the only structure she knows.
In politics the parallel is imperfect, but not empty. The state and its dominant parties control the narrative, the institutions, the moral language, and the distribution of status and resources. They define what counts as compassion, what counts as bigotry, what counts as progress. Over time, a portion of the public absorbs that framing so thoroughly that they experience criticism of the ruling order as a threat to their own identity. To reject the party that has overseen declining living standards and social fragmentation can feel like rejecting the only legitimate source of moral authority. The hand that harms becomes the hand that also defines reality.
This is not a claim that voters are irrational children. Most people are trying to navigate a complex information environment under conditions of institutional distrust. But the emotional structure is recognisable. The same voters who complain about cost of living, housing, and crime will still turn out for the parties that delivered those outcomes, provided those parties continue to speak the approved language of care, inclusion, and progress. Not all of course, but still many. The alternative is framed not merely as wrong, but as dangerous, hateful, or unserious. Leaving the relationship feels riskier than staying inside it.
The analogy has limits. Countries are not households, and elections are not hostages situations. People retain agency, and many do break the pattern, hence the periodic surges of populist and anti-establishment voting. Yet the persistence of support for policies that impose concentrated costs on the very constituencies that sustain them suggests something deeper than simple miscalculation. It suggests a form of psychological accommodation to power.
Societies recover from bad policy. They recover more slowly from the habits of mind that make bad policy feel like the only moral option. When a significant share of the public has internalised the idea that the institutions harming them are also the sole guardians of decency, the path back to self-government becomes longer and harder. The first step is to name the dynamic without sentimentality: some people are voting for the hand that strikes them, and they have been taught to experience that strike as care.