Space is no longer just a domain for satellites and scientific curiosity. In the recent US-Israel campaign against Iran — particularly Operation Epic Fury launched on 28 February 2026 — the orbital realm has emerged as a primary front in modern warfare. What was once support infrastructure (communications, navigation, intelligence) has become a decisive arena where the first blows are struck to blind the enemy before kinetic strikes begin.
The Spectator's recent analysis of "How We Wage War in Space" captures this shift perfectly. Coordinated space and cyber operations acted as "first movers," disrupting Iran's ability to see, communicate, and respond. US Space Command and Cyber Command layered non-kinetic effects — jamming, spoofing, hacking — that degraded Iranian sensors and networks before bombs fell on nuclear sites like Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
How Space Was Used in the Iran Conflict
Several key tactics defined the space dimension of the fighting:
Blinding the Enemy Early: US Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) satellites detected thermal signatures of Iranian ballistic missile launches almost instantly, feeding data into automated defence systems. Iran's limited satellite fleet — including imaging satellites launched via Russian rockets — was among the first targets hit or compromised. Ground stations such as Mahdasht (Iran's main satellite control and imagery hub), Salmas, and Chenaran were struck early, crippling Iran's ability to process its own orbital intelligence.
Electronic Warfare and Jamming: GPS signals proved highly vulnerable. In the opening hours, Iran jammed or spoofed GPS, affecting over 1,000 ships in the region — some reportedly misdirected toward Iranian airports or nuclear sites. Iran later switched to China's BeiDou navigation system (considered more resilient), but US forces likely countered with BeiDou jamming as well. Electronic warfare aircraft targeted Iranian radars at nuclear facilities.
Cyber-Space Integration: US Cyber Command hacked Iranian air defences and even seized control of state news agency IRNA at a critical moment. Israel hijacked the BadeSaba prayer app to send demoralising messages to Iranian military personnel. Commercial proxies played a role too: Chinese firm MizarVision released high-resolution imagery of US and allied assets (e.g., aircraft in Diego Garcia, Patriot sites in Bahrain), effectively providing proxy intelligence to Iran.
Drone Swarms via Space Links: The US deployed low-cost uncrewed combat systems (reverse-engineered from Iranian Shahed drones) controlled through upgraded Starlink military variants. This demonstrated how commercial low-Earth orbit constellations enable persistent command-and-control even in contested environments. Israel has relied heavily on its Ofek reconnaissance satellites for real-time targeting.
Iran's own space program, still modest compared to US or Chinese capabilities, suffered direct hits. Facilities linked to anti-satellite development and reconnaissance were targeted, underscoring that dual-use space infrastructure (civilian-sounding but militarily valuable) is now fair game.
What This Reveals About Modern Warfare
The Iran conflict confirms a new reality: space superiority is a prerequisite for air and ground dominance. You blind your adversary's eyes in orbit (or jam their signals) before you strike. Traditional "kill chains" now include electromagnetic and cyber layers that start hundreds of kilometres above Earth.
Vulnerabilities are glaring. GPS remains surprisingly fragile — weaker than a TV remote signal in some respects — making jamming and spoofing cheap and effective asymmetric tools. Commercial satellites blur the lines between civilian and military targets, raising legal and escalation questions under the Law of Armed Conflict. Proxy actors (like Chinese imagery firms) add another layer of deniability and complexity.
What is Likely to Come Next
The lessons from Epic Fury point to an accelerating arms race in orbit:
Satellite Swarms and AI Coordination: The US Space Force's "Objective Force 2040" vision includes doubling in size and deploying AI-orchestrated satellite constellations around Earth — and potentially extending to cislunar space (the area between Earth and the Moon). China has signalled interest in lunar operations too. Future conflicts may feature autonomous "swarms" that provide persistent surveillance, communications, and even space-based interceptors as part of multilayered defences like America's proposed Golden Dome.
Counter-Space Weapons Proliferation: Jamming, spoofing, cyber attacks on ground stations, and directed-energy or co-orbital "inspector" satellites will become standard. Kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) tests (like Russia's 2021 debris-generating strike) risk creating dangerous orbital debris fields, but non-kinetic options (reversible jamming or hacking) offer lower escalation thresholds.
Commercial Space as a Battlefield: Starlink/Starshield-style constellations have proven resilient yet targetable. Expect more states and non-state actors to develop jamming capabilities against them, as Iran attempted during internet blackouts. Companies providing high-resolution imagery will face pressure to pause or censor data during conflicts.
Escalation Risks with Major Powers: While Iran's space capabilities were limited and quickly degraded, a future clash involving China or Russia would be far more dangerous. Both nations have advanced counter-space programs. Lessons from Iran (e.g., exposed Chinese tech vulnerabilities when intertwined with Iranian systems) could shape planning for a Taiwan scenario. Proxy support — Russia sharing satellite imagery, China providing dual-use tech — already complicates containment.
Algorithmic and Autonomous Warfare: Humans are becoming the bottleneck. AI for target processing, brain-computer interfaces for drone control (Israel is exploring this), and dormant assets "awaiting activation" suggest conflicts where decisions happen at machine speed.
In short, the 2026 Iran war has taken warfare into "unseen territory." What begins with jamming a few GPS signals or hacking a satellite ground station can cascade into widespread disruption of navigation, banking, aviation, and military coordination.
For Australia and other nations reliant on space-dependent infrastructure (GPS for everything from farming to defence, satellite comms for remote areas), this is a wake-up call. Protecting orbital assets, investing in resilient alternatives (multi-constellation navigation, hardened ground systems), and developing clear doctrines for space operations will be critical.
Space is no longer a sanctuary. It is contested territory and the next war may well be decided by who controls the view from above.
https://spectator.com/article/how-we-wage-war-in-space/