Outgoing Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has dropped one of the more significant disclosures of recent years. In a declassified release on June 12, 2026, Gabbard revealed longstanding US government funding for more than 120 biological laboratories operating in over 30 countries, including a heavy concentration in Ukraine. The documents confirm what many sceptics had suspected for years: America has maintained an extensive, low-visibility network of overseas biolabs handling dangerous pathogens, some involving gain-of-function research, with limited public oversight.

This is not a handful of cooperative public health projects. It is a sprawling international infrastructure built over decades, primarily through the Pentagon's Biological Threat Reduction Program and related initiatives. The scale alone raises immediate and legitimate questions. Why does the United States need to fund and support 120 biolabs scattered across 30-plus nations when it already possesses some of the world's most advanced, secure, and high-containment facilities on its own soil? Places like Fort Detrick, the CDC's laboratories in Atlanta, and numerous university BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs within America's tightly regulated environment would seem more than adequate for legitimate research into pathogens, surveillance, and threat reduction.

The official explanation has long centred on "biosecurity" and "threat reduction," particularly in former Soviet states. The argument runs that after the collapse of the USSR, the US stepped in to secure old Soviet-era biological weapons stockpiles and prevent rogue actors from acquiring dangerous materials. That sounds reasonable on paper. Yet the sheer number of facilities, their geographic spread, and the nature of the work conducted inside many of them suggest something more ambitious, and murkier, is at play.

Ukraine as the Flashpoint

Nowhere has this network come under greater scrutiny than in Ukraine, where over 40 of these US-supported labs have operated. Gabbard's release explicitly notes that some of these facilities house dangerous pathogens and remain vulnerable amid the ongoing war. Intelligence warnings highlighted risks of Russian attack, seizure, or accidental release. This aligns with earlier concerns raised during the early stages of the Ukraine conflict, when Russian claims about US biolabs were widely dismissed as propaganda. The declassified evidence now makes clear that the labs existed and received substantial American funding, even if the precise activities inside them remain partially obscured.

The deeper issue is not whether every lab was building biological weapons. Most appear focused on surveillance, diagnostics, and pathogen research under the banner of public health. The problem lies in the dual-use potential of such work. Gain-of-function experiments, which enhance the transmissibility or virulence of viruses, can blur the line between defensive research and something far riskier. When conducted in countries with varying standards of biosafety, weaker regulatory oversight, and geopolitical instability, the potential for accidental leaks or deliberate misuse grows significantly.

Why So Many Overseas Labs?

This is the core question that refuses to be answered satisfactorily. If the goal were purely defensive threat reduction and legitimate scientific inquiry, concentrating high-level research in secure, domestically controlled facilities within the United States or trusted allies would make far more sense. It would allow tighter control over security protocols, chain of custody for dangerous materials, and accountability. Spreading operations across 30 countries, many with histories of corruption, political instability, or adversarial interests, introduces unnecessary layers of risk and opacity.

Critics argue this global footprint serves other purposes: offshoring controversial experiments that face stricter scrutiny at home, building influence through scientific dependency in partner nations, or maintaining strategic biological intelligence capabilities. The history of US biodefence programs shows a recurring pattern of mission creep, where defensive programs edge into more aggressive research. The COVID-19 pandemic and debates over the Wuhan Institute of Virology only heightened public awareness of how gain-of-function work, funded or facilitated by US entities, can have catastrophic global consequences.

Gabbard's move, tied to President Trump's executive order ending federal funding for dangerous gain-of-function research abroad, represents a long-overdue push for transparency and restraint. The declassified materials and ongoing reviews aim to map exactly what pathogens are stored where and what kind of research is occurring. This is welcome, but it also underscores how much has been hidden from the American public for years under layers of classification and deflection.

The Shonky Element

There is something fundamentally shonky about the whole arrangement. When officials and media spent years denying or downplaying the existence of this network while simultaneously funding it, public trust eroded further. Accusations of conspiracy were weaponised against those asking basic questions about accountability, cost, and risk. Now that the scale has been officially acknowledged, the defensive narrative shifts to "nothing to see here, just routine public health cooperation."

Legitimate biosecurity work has value. The world faces real threats from natural outbreaks and potential bioterrorism. But when a superpower maintains over 120 pathogen-handling labs abroad rather than prioritising domestic excellence and minimal necessary international partnerships, it invites suspicion. The concentration in conflict zones like Ukraine, combined with past biosafety incidents globally, suggests that bureaucratic inertia, scientific ambition, and geopolitical strategy have outrun prudent risk assessment.

The American people deserve full transparency on every dollar spent, every pathogen studied, and every protocol followed. Until that level of openness is achieved, the global biolab network will remain a legitimate source of concern rather than reassurance. Gabbard's disclosure is a step toward accountability, but the deeper reckoning with why such an extensive, dispersed system was built in the first place is only beginning. In an age of engineered pandemics and great power competition, "trust the experts" no longer suffices when the experts refuse to level with the public about the full scope of their activities.

https://www.malone.news/p/dni-gabbard-reveals-evidence-of-us