One of the oldest truths of strategy is that geography shapes power. For decades, Iran's greatest strategic advantage has not been its economy or conventional military strength, but its ability to threaten one of the world's most important maritime choke points: the Strait of Hormuz. When roughly a fifth of the world's seaborne oil passes through a narrow waterway, even the possibility of disruption grants enormous leverage. That leverage has influenced global diplomacy for decades.
Now that leverage may slowly be disappearing.
Recent reports indicate that Gulf states, with strong encouragement from the United States, are accelerating no fewer than seven major pipeline projects designed to bypass Hormuz altogether. Existing routes across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea are being expanded, the UAE continues strengthening exports via Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, while Iraq is pursuing alternative corridors towards Turkey, Syria and Jordan. The long-term objective is straightforward: if oil can flow without passing through Iranian-controlled waters, Tehran's ability to threaten the global economy diminishes substantially. Analysts suggest that by the end of the decade a majority of Gulf oil exports could avoid Hormuz altogether, although the transition will take years and will not eliminate every vulnerability.
If that strategy succeeds, an interesting political possibility emerges.
Rather than attempting to overthrow the Iranian regime or occupying a country of ninety million people, the United States and Israel may conclude that the immediate strategic objective has already been achieved. If Iran's principal coercive bargaining chip is steadily neutralised, there may be little appetite for an open-ended regional war whose costs continue to escalate.
Such an outcome would fit a familiar pattern in modern military strategy. Rather than seeking unconditional victory, governments often seek to reduce an adversary's capacity to threaten their vital interests. Once that objective is reached, attention shifts elsewhere.
The nuclear issue, however, complicates everything.
If Tehran continues enriching uranium or rebuilding facilities damaged during the present conflict, future governments in Washington or Jerusalem may decide that another round of military strikes is required. The logic becomes almost mechanical. Intelligence reports renewed activity. Bombers fly. Facilities are damaged. Reconstruction begins. Intelligence reports renewed activity. Bombers return.
The image is almost impossible to resist.
It resembles the old carnival game "Whack-a-Mole." Every time one target disappears beneath the surface, another pops up somewhere else. Strike one enrichment facility and another appears underground. Destroy a centrifuge complex and engineers begin rebuilding elsewhere. Every apparent solution merely starts another cycle.
There is something deeply absurd about this.
Not amusing, because the consequences involve human lives and immense destruction, but absurd in the philosophical sense. Modern civilisation, with satellites, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence and precision-guided weapons, risks becoming trapped in a repetitive loop that resembles an arcade game. Billions of dollars are spent, thousands of people die, governments issue solemn statements about lasting security, and a few years later everyone finds themselves confronting essentially the same strategic dilemma.
Albert Camus wrote about the myth of Sisyphus, condemned forever to push a boulder uphill only for it to roll back down. Modern geopolitics sometimes appears to operate under similar rules. The technology changes. The rhetoric changes. The press conferences change. Yet the underlying cycle stubbornly repeats itself.
Pipeline construction offers one of the few genuinely structural solutions. Unlike another bombing campaign, a pipeline changes the strategic landscape permanently. It alters incentives rather than simply destroying targets. That is why infrastructure sometimes matters more than firepower. A bypass route cannot eliminate every security problem, but it can reduce the value of holding the choke point hostage.
Even so, new infrastructure creates new vulnerabilities. Pipelines themselves require protection, and shifting exports toward the Red Sea or other routes can expose them to different threats, including attacks on ports, pumping stations or shipping lanes. Bypassing Hormuz therefore reduces one strategic risk rather than abolishing risk altogether.
Perhaps that is the larger lesson.
Wars are rarely ended by a single decisive battle. More often they fade because the strategic environment changes. Technology evolves. Trade routes shift. Alliances adjust. What once seemed an indispensable source of leverage gradually loses its importance.
If the Gulf states can successfully reduce dependence on Hormuz, Iran's bargaining position may weaken considerably. The incentive for perpetual confrontation could diminish as well.
One hopes that diplomacy eventually replaces bombardment. Otherwise the world risks watching another decade of geopolitical "Whack-a-Mole," in which every apparent victory merely resets the game for the next round. History deserves better than an endless carnival ride.