By John Wayne on Tuesday, 17 November 2026
Category: Race, Culture, Nation

Legal Analysis: The Treaty Trick: Why Hanson v Faruqi is Bigger than Hanson

 The High Court's decision on 5 November 2026 to grant Pauline Hanson special leave to appeal in her dispute with Greens senator Mehreen Faruqi presents an opportunity to examine one of the most consequential questions in Australian constitutional law. Much of the public discussion has predictably been framed as another confrontation between free speech and racial vilification, with the familiar political personalities occupying their customary positions. But that framing risks missing the deeper constitutional issue. The real question is how far the Commonwealth can extend its legislative power by entering into international treaties and then enacting domestic laws said to implement them. If the connection between a treaty obligation and the legislation supposedly giving effect to it becomes sufficiently elastic, the Commonwealth's constitutionally limited powers may become limited in name only.

The personalities are almost incidental, although the circumstances of the dispute illustrate the political tensions involved. Following the death of Queen Elizabeth II in September 2022, Faruqi declared that she could not mourn the leader of what she described as a racist empire built upon stolen lives, land and wealth. Hanson responded by telling Faruqi to return to Pakistan, using considerably less parliamentary language. Faruqi subsequently complained under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, and the dispute eventually reached the Federal Court. Justice Angus Stewart found that Hanson's public remarks contravened section 18C and ordered their removal. The Full Federal Court dismissed Hanson's appeal in July 2026. The High Court will now have an opportunity to consider the constitutional issues arising from the case.

There is an obvious irony in two Commonwealth senators exchanging provocative political statements about empire, immigration, national identity and historical injustice, only for one of them to find herself defending her remarks in federal litigation. Faruqi's denunciation of the British Empire was plainly intended as a severe moral condemnation of an important part of Australia's historical inheritance. Hanson's response was a personal attack referring to Faruqi's Pakistani origin. The statements are not legally identical, since criticism of an empire is not automatically discrimination against people because of their national or ethnic origin. Nevertheless, the episode raises an important question about the boundaries of permissible political expression and the extent to which those boundaries are applied consistently.

Section 18C makes certain public conduct unlawful where it is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or group because of race, colour or national or ethnic origin. The provision is civil rather than criminal, and courts have interpreted it as requiring more than merely trivial offence. Section 18D also provides exemptions for certain artistic, academic and public-interest communications undertaken reasonably and in good faith. These qualifications do not eliminate the central concern. The Commonwealth has enacted a law under which political speech may generate legal liability because of its relationship to racial or national identity and its likely effect upon others.

The constitutional question is how the Commonwealth acquired the power to enact such a law in the first place.

Australia's Constitution establishes a federal government possessing enumerated legislative powers. Unlike a government exercising unlimited general legislative authority, the Commonwealth Parliament must identify a constitutional source for its legislation. One of those sources is section 51(xxix), the external affairs power. Under established High Court jurisprudence, this power permits the Commonwealth to legislate to implement Australia's obligations under international treaties, even where the subject matter might otherwise fall principally within state legislative responsibility.

There is an intelligible reason for this arrangement. Australia must be capable of fulfilling international obligations it has lawfully undertaken. But the doctrine creates a profound constitutional tension. Treaties are entered into by the executive government, while legislation implementing them is enacted by Parliament. Although parliamentary approval is still required for domestic legislation, the executive's treaty-making decisions can substantially expand the range of matters upon which the Commonwealth Parliament may legislate.

The implications for federalism are enormous. A constitutional system designed to distribute powers between the Commonwealth and the states can be progressively centralised through international commitments. Matters that might otherwise remain beyond Commonwealth legislative competence become susceptible to federal regulation because they have been incorporated into a treaty framework.

The Racial Discrimination Act is an important example. Its constitutional foundations include Australia's obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, commonly known as ICERD. Article 4 of that convention addresses racial superiority, racial hatred and incitement to racial discrimination. Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also relevant to the broader international framework, requires the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.

These provisions address serious matters. Racial hatred, incitement and discriminatory conduct are not equivalent to ordinary political disagreement or the expression of offensive opinions. The treaties also exist within an international human-rights framework that recognises freedom of expression. Article 4 of ICERD expressly requires due regard to principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights set out in the convention itself.

The difficulty is that section 18C extends to conduct reasonably likely to offend or insult, terms that appear considerably broader than the international prohibitions concerning racial hatred and incitement. Australian courts have narrowed the practical operation of those terms through interpretation, but the difference between the statutory language and the treaty provisions remains a serious constitutional issue.

The Commonwealth's response is that legislation implementing a treaty need not reproduce its precise wording. That proposition is supported by established High Court authority, including the Tasmanian Dam Case, Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983). Parliament has latitude in selecting measures reasonably capable of implementing treaty obligations. The constitutional question is therefore not whether section 18C is word-for-word identical to the relevant treaty provisions, but whether it bears a sufficiently close and genuine relationship to their implementation.

This is where the Full Federal Court's reasoning becomes particularly important.

In Hanson v Faruqi [2026] FCAFC 96, the Court relied upon earlier authority supporting the proposition that section 18C can operate preventively, intervening before conduct develops into the more serious forms of racial hatred or discrimination addressed by international obligations. The reasoning draws upon the idea that legislation may legitimately seek to "nip in the bud" conduct that could contribute to the development of racial hostility.

That phrase should concern anyone interested in the constitutional limits of Commonwealth power.

Preventive legislation is not inherently illegitimate. Governments routinely act to prevent harm before it occurs. But when preventive reasoning is used to establish constitutional legislative competence, the question becomes how remote the regulated conduct may be from the treaty obligation supposedly being implemented.

If a treaty requires the prohibition of incitement to racial hatred, may Parliament also prohibit conduct that might contribute to an atmosphere in which racial hostility could eventually develop? If so, how far does that principle extend? Could increasingly remote forms of expression be regulated on the theory that they might create conditions conducive to conduct addressed by an international treaty?

There must be a meaningful constitutional boundary somewhere. Otherwise, the requirement that legislation genuinely implement a treaty risks becoming little more than a drafting exercise. A sufficiently imaginative government could identify an international obligation, construct a preventive relationship between that obligation and a desired domestic policy, and claim constitutional authority over matters that would otherwise lie outside Commonwealth competence.

This is the treaty trick. The executive enters into an international agreement, Parliament invokes the external affairs power, and a constitutional limitation intended to restrain federal authority becomes progressively less effective.

The danger is not that every law connected to a treaty automatically becomes valid. The High Court has imposed requirements concerning the relationship between legislation and treaty obligations. The danger is that those requirements may become so permissive that they cease to provide meaningful protection against the expansion of federal power.

Section 18C provides a particularly important test because it concerns political expression, one of the activities most closely connected with Australia's system of representative and responsible government.

There is a second issue, however, which constitutional doctrine alone cannot resolve. It concerns the political operation of racial vilification laws and the perception that they are applied unevenly.

The legislation is formally neutral. It protects individuals and groups regardless of their racial or national background. Yet the prominent political controversies surrounding section 18C have frequently involved critics of immigration, multiculturalism, Indigenous policy and other subjects on which progressive opinion has become influential within major institutions.

Where are the comparable high-profile proceedings against progressive politicians and commentators who denounce Australia's European settlement, its colonial inheritance or the moral character of its founding population? Such commentary can be deliberately provocative and deeply offensive to those who identify with the nation's history. It does not necessarily satisfy the legal requirements of section 18C, but the difference between political criticism and racially directed insult deserves consistent examination.

There have been section 18C proceedings involving speakers who cannot reasonably be classified as conservative. The law is not exclusively directed against the political Right. Nor are complete public statistics available that would establish the ideological distribution of complaints, many of which are resolved without published judicial decisions. Nevertheless, the concern about ideological asymmetry remains legitimate. A law that restricts expression on grounds of racial vilification must be applied according to consistent legal principles, not according to the political acceptability of the speaker's opinions.

The difficulty is compounded by the enforcement process. Section 18C is not a criminal offence, but civil proceedings can impose substantial financial and personal burdens. Complaints are initially handled through the Australian Human Rights Commission, which may attempt conciliation. The parties cannot be compelled to reach an agreement, and refusal to settle does not establish liability. Nevertheless, unresolved complaints may proceed to federal litigation, where legal representation, procedural complexity and the risk of adverse costs can become formidable obstacles.

This creates a chilling effect independent of the final outcome. A person contemplating controversial political commentary may reasonably consider not only whether the speech is lawful, but whether defending its legality would be financially ruinous. The process itself can become a deterrent.

Such concerns are not confined to conservative speakers. Any law exposing political expression to costly litigation creates the possibility of strategic complaints, regardless of the ideological identities of those involved. But where the law operates in a highly polarised political environment, the risk of selective pressure becomes especially troubling.

There is also the constitutional implied freedom of political communication. Unlike the United States, Australia possesses no express constitutional guarantee equivalent to the First Amendment. The High Court has instead recognised an implication arising from the constitutional system of representative and responsible government.

That implied freedom is not a personal right to say whatever one wishes. It operates as a limitation upon legislative and executive power, protecting the system of political communication necessary for constitutional government. The courts assess whether a law burdens political communication and, if so, whether the burden is constitutionally justified.

This produces a complex legal framework in which the validity of restrictions may depend upon judicial assessments of legitimate purpose, suitability, necessity and proportionality. The doctrine has developed considerably over time, but its practical boundaries remain contested.

The Hanson litigation raises an obvious question. If two elected senators are engaged in public argument about national identity, immigration and Australia's historical character, how much constitutional protection should their communications receive?

This does not require approval of Hanson's language. Her remarks can be criticised as crude, offensive and politically counterproductive. The question is whether the Commonwealth possesses constitutional authority to make such expression unlawful, particularly when it occurs in an explicitly political exchange between elected representatives.

The distinction between defending speech and endorsing its content is fundamental. A constitutional freedom worth possessing must protect at least some expression that many citizens regard as offensive, objectionable or foolish. Otherwise, the freedom becomes merely permission to express opinions already acceptable to those exercising authority.

The High Court may ultimately uphold section 18C, invalidate some part of it, or resolve the appeal on narrower grounds. One possible approach would be to examine whether particular statutory terms impose an unjustified burden upon political communication, although severing words such as "offend" and "insult" would itself raise questions about statutory construction and legislative intention. No outcome should be assumed before the Court has heard and determined the appeal.

Whatever the result, the underlying constitutional problem will remain.

Australia's external affairs power has become one of the principal mechanisms through which Commonwealth legislative authority can expand into areas once regarded as substantially within state responsibility. The issue extends far beyond racial vilification. International agreements concern environmental regulation, labour standards, discrimination, cultural heritage, human rights and numerous other matters. Each may provide a constitutional foundation for domestic legislation.

The cumulative consequences deserve far more public attention than they receive. Federalism was not included in the Constitution as a decorative historical arrangement. It was intended to distribute authority and prevent excessive concentration of political power. A doctrine allowing the executive's international commitments to facilitate extensive domestic legislative authority must therefore be accompanied by meaningful constitutional limits.

The political class has little incentive to confront this problem. Governments of different persuasions have benefited from expansive interpretations of Commonwealth power. The temptation to centralise authority does not belong exclusively to one political party. Once a constitutional mechanism for enlarging federal competence exists, successive governments can discover reasons to use it.

That is why the Hanson case is bigger than Hanson. The immediate controversy concerns an offensive political statement and the legal consequences that followed. The deeper controversy concerns the capacity of the Commonwealth to regulate domestic conduct by relying upon international commitments whose scope may be interpreted increasingly broadly.

The High Court has an opportunity to clarify the constitutional relationship between treaty obligations and legislation that goes beyond their express requirements. It can examine whether preventive regulation has meaningful limits and whether the implied freedom of political communication constrains the application of section 18C to exchanges between elected representatives.

But even a successful constitutional challenge would not resolve the wider problem of freedom of expression in Australia.

The country still lacks an express constitutional protection comparable to the American First Amendment. Australians remain dependent upon statutory protections, common-law principles and an implied constitutional limitation whose application requires complex judicial analysis. Those protections are real, but they are not equivalent to an express constitutional guarantee of individual freedom of speech.

Nor would invalidating part of section 18C eliminate the broader machinery of complaint-driven speech regulation. Parliament could consider replacement legislation drafted to address the constitutional objections identified by the Court. The struggle over the boundaries of political expression would continue.

Ultimately, the solution requires political as well as judicial action. Australians must decide whether freedom of political expression should remain largely dependent upon legislation and judicial implication, or whether it deserves explicit constitutional recognition. Any proposal for constitutional change would require careful drafting, democratic debate and approval through the referendum process. But the question should no longer be avoided merely because constitutional reform is difficult.

A constitutional democracy cannot function properly if citizens become reluctant to discuss immigration, national identity, historical injustice or the conduct of their elected representatives for fear of legal proceedings. Such subjects are not peripheral to political life. They are among the central questions upon which democratic disagreement must remain possible.

The point is not that offensive speech is admirable, or that racial hostility is harmless. It is that the state must demonstrate compelling constitutional justification before restricting political expression, particularly when the restriction is founded upon an expansive interpretation of powers derived from international treaties.

The treaty power will remain after Hanson v Faruqi. So will the political temptation to use it. The High Court may establish a firmer boundary, but it cannot substitute for a public commitment to constitutional limits and freedom of political debate.

The real prize in this case is not Pauline Hanson's personal vindication. It is the opportunity to insist that the Commonwealth remains a government of limited powers, and that international agreements cannot become an endlessly adaptable means of escaping those limits.

A constitution that can be expanded whenever the executive signs an international agreement is a constitution whose restraints are in danger of becoming conditional. The High Court must decide whether the external affairs power still possesses a meaningful boundary. Australians must decide whether their freedom to speak should depend upon how generously that boundary is interpreted.

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/hansons-case-is-a-test-of-free-speech-and-judicial-egos/news-story/160a38584ad09d3cfd6a58942db82b89