Iran is treating renewed US strikes as probable, has shifted to explicit targeting of Gulf technology infrastructure, and is combining that threat with ongoing maritime pressure and site fortifications, raising the likelihood of a wider next phase once the midterm pause ends.
Regional diplomats describe an atmosphere in Tehran in which further American operations are expected in the near term rather than treated as hypothetical. Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohsen Rezaei has stated that if the United States resumes strikes, Iran will destroy American data centres, AI facilities, undersea cables and other technology infrastructure in the Gulf, assets he valued at more than two trillion dollars and called "the pulse of the American economy in this region." Iranian media and the Revolutionary Guards have published lists naming major US technology companies (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Oracle, Palantir and others) as legitimate targets. This is not abstract: earlier in the war that began in late February 2026, Iranian drones damaged Amazon Web Services facilities in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
These threats sit inside a broader pattern of preparation. Satellite imagery shows fortification work around nuclear sites and border areas. Missile tests and military drills have continued, and paramilitary units have prepared civilians, including reading war stories to children and training them on anti-aircraft weapons. Iranian officials have warned Arab counterparts that Saudi oil facilities and targets in the UAE could be hit, with some raising the possibility of limited ground incursions into neighbouring states. IRGC messaging has framed the conflict in existential terms; one senior official compared its potential consequences to the world wars, a formulation that lowers the political cost of further escalation if hardliners judge that preserving leverage outweighs the risks.
Maritime activity supplies a concurrent indicator. Iran has intensified strikes on commercial vessels in and near the Strait of Hormuz, recording multiple ships hit in single days in mid-October, the highest daily totals of the conflict. IRGC statements have framed coastal defence and fast-attack units as waiting for US or coalition vessels. These actions raise the cost of the existing naval blockade on Iranian oil exports while testing responses without immediately triggering a full-scale aerial campaign. Parallel Houthi strikes on Saudi airports and energy infrastructure add further pressure points that Tehran can amplify.
On the American side, the declared pause before the 3 November midterms has not been accompanied by demobilisation. Reporting indicates that US Central Command has completed preparations for possible resumption of major combat operations, with strike options that include high-yield munitions against energy and nuclear infrastructure. President Trump has said no attack would occur before the midterms while describing talks as productive and leaving open a decision "very soon." Israeli officials have separately discussed renewed operations timed around their own electoral calendar. Neither side has identified a diplomatic formula that meets core requirements: Iran seeks relief from the blockade and economic pressure without the concessions on its nuclear and regional programmes that Washington has demanded.
The practical effect of attacks on Gulf technology assets would be immediate and uneven. Data centres in the region support cloud services, financial clearing, logistics platforms and military communications for both commercial and defence operations. A successful strike or prolonged disruption could interrupt banking, shipping coordination and intelligence links even without total hardware destruction. Undersea cables carrying a large share of traffic between Europe, Asia and the Gulf are vulnerable to physical sabotage. Because many facilities sit in partner countries, the political burden of protection falls partly on host governments balancing their own security against American demands.
Hardening is possible but incomplete. Operators can disperse critical workloads, maintain offline backups, strengthen physical defences against drones and missiles, and use redundant routing around known cable landing points. Network segmentation, removal of unnecessary internet-facing industrial controllers, and rapid patching limit simpler cyber tactics. Joint exercises with Gulf partners can improve early warning and recovery. None of these measures eliminate the risk: cheap drones and missiles remain difficult to intercept in volume, and determined actors can still exploit unpatched systems or social engineering.
The United States retains far greater offensive cyber capacity. Stuxnet demonstrated the ability to reach nuclear-related industrial systems inside Iran; more recent reporting indicates cyber tools have been integrated with kinetic strikes on Iranian air defences and other military infrastructure. In a renewed campaign the United States could, in principle, disable Iranian command networks, disrupt financial or energy systems inside Iran, or degrade the same class of technology assets that Tehran now threatens in the Gulf. Such operations carry escalation and civilian-service risks, but the technical means exist on a larger scale.
The current pause has not removed the underlying problem. As long as the conflict can resume, both sides have incentives to treat the other's regional technology infrastructure as a legitimate target. Iran's explicit warning simply makes that calculation public, converting commercial data centres and cables into part of the battlefield. Combined with fortifications, shipping attacks, the absence of an agreed off-ramp, and the midterm calendar as a clear temporal marker after which political constraints on Washington ease, the observable indicators point toward resumption rather than indefinite stalemate. The next round is therefore likely to be wider than earlier phases, extending beyond missile and drone exchanges to potential strikes on Gulf commercial and digital infrastructure, continued pressure on shipping lanes, and the possibility of limited ground actions.
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https://rt-english.com/news/647096-iran-us-tech-targets