More than six centuries ago, a North African Muslim historian developed one of the most penetrating theories of the rise and fall of civilisations ever written. Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), in his great work The Muqaddimah, argued that powerful societies contain within their success the seeds of their eventual destruction. Civilisations arise through discipline, solidarity, courage and common purpose. They become prosperous, sophisticated and comfortable. But prosperity gradually undermines the very qualities that made their achievements possible. Their ruling classes become increasingly detached from ordinary people, government expenditure expands, taxation grows burdensome, and the collective loyalties that once sustained the political order begin to disintegrate.

Although Ibn Khaldun was writing about the dynasties and societies of medieval North Africa and the Islamic world, his analysis has striking implications for the contemporary West. Indeed, the disturbing question is whether modern Western civilisation is displaying many of the symptoms he associated with historical decline.

Ibn Khaldun's central concept was asabiyyah, commonly translated as group solidarity, social cohesion or collective feeling. He observed that communities capable of establishing powerful states generally possessed strong internal bonds. Their members were prepared to sacrifice for one another, endure hardship, defend their communities and subordinate immediate personal advantage to collective survival. These qualities were especially evident among the tribal and nomadic societies with which he was familiar.

Such groups could overcome larger, wealthier and more sophisticated states because their internal solidarity gave them a political and military advantage. The established rulers might possess magnificent cities, accumulated wealth and elaborate institutions, but they had often lost the discipline and determination that originally created their power.

Victory, however, contained its own paradox. Once the conquering group established a stable government, it acquired wealth and access to the comforts of urban civilisation. Its descendants grew up without experiencing the hardships that had formed their ancestors. Over successive generations, the founding solidarity weakened. The ruling dynasty became increasingly concerned with preserving privilege rather than fulfilling the common purposes that originally justified its authority.

Ibn Khaldun described a recurring progression through the establishment of power, consolidation, prosperity, complacency and eventual wastefulness. His famous account of dynasties declining over approximately three generations was not a mathematical law applicable to every society. Rather, it expressed his observation that inherited wealth and authority frequently failed to reproduce the qualities of those who had originally acquired them.

This is where his analysis becomes particularly relevant to the modern West. Western civilisation achieved extraordinary prosperity through a combination of scientific discovery, technological innovation, economic development, institutional stability and cultural traditions that encouraged disciplined work and long-term investment. Its achievements transformed the material conditions of human existence.

Yet the descendants of those who built this civilisation increasingly inhabit a world in which its achievements are taken for granted. Reliable electricity, advanced medicine, abundant food, sophisticated transport and extensive public services appear almost as natural features of existence. The immense accumulated labour, technical knowledge and institutional discipline required to sustain them become largely invisible.

A society can consequently develop the dangerous illusion that prosperity is automatic. Political leaders may promise ever-expanding benefits without adequately confronting the productive and financial foundations upon which those benefits depend. Citizens may come to regard inherited institutions as permanent guarantees rather than fragile achievements requiring continual maintenance.

Ibn Khaldun would have recognised the danger. For him, luxury was not merely a matter of expensive clothing or extravagant entertainment. It represented a transformation in social character. People accustomed to comfort could lose the willingness to endure hardship, accept responsibility and defend the institutions upon which their prosperity depended.

This does not mean that poverty is virtuous or that material progress necessarily produces moral corruption. Ibn Khaldun himself recognised the achievements of urban civilisation, including its arts, learning and economic sophistication. His argument was more subtle: prosperity becomes dangerous when it destroys the social discipline and collective purpose that make prosperity sustainable.

The contemporary Western welfare state illustrates the complexity of this problem. Social insurance, healthcare and assistance to vulnerable citizens can strengthen a society by protecting people against misfortune. But an expanding system of public expenditure can also become unsustainable if political competition encourages governments to promise benefits without maintaining the productive capacity needed to finance them.

Ibn Khaldun devoted considerable attention to taxation and economic decline. He argued that governments in their earlier, more disciplined phases could often collect substantial revenue through relatively modest taxation because economic activity remained vigorous. As dynasties became more extravagant, rulers imposed heavier burdens upon their subjects. Eventually, excessive taxation discouraged productive activity and weakened the revenue base upon which the state depended.

His observations anticipate an important principle of political economy: taxation affects incentives, investment and production. The precise relationship varies according to circumstances, and modern economies cannot simply be equated with medieval dynasties. Nevertheless, the broader warning remains relevant. A government cannot indefinitely expand its claims upon society without considering the consequences for those who create the wealth being distributed.

Western governments now face enormous fiscal pressures arising from ageing populations, public debt, defence commitments, healthcare expenditure and expectations of continuing public support. These problems are not proof of imminent collapse, but they do raise questions about the long-term balance between political promises and economic capacity.

An even more important aspect of Ibn Khaldun's theory concerns the estrangement of rulers from the people they govern. As dynasties mature, political authority becomes concentrated within increasingly exclusive circles. Rulers surround themselves with officials, dependants and advisers whose interests may differ substantially from those of the wider population. The original bond between leadership and community deteriorates.

Something resembling this development can be observed in contemporary Western political life. Political authority increasingly operates through large bureaucracies, regulatory agencies, international institutions, professional consultancies and specialised administrative networks. Many of these bodies perform necessary functions, but their growth can create distance between decision-makers and ordinary citizens.

The problem becomes especially serious when political and administrative elites develop shared assumptions that are not widely accepted by the population. Questions involving immigration, energy policy, national sovereignty, cultural identity and economic management may be treated as matters already settled by expert consensus, leaving ordinary voters with little sense that their concerns are being genuinely considered.

The result can be declining trust in established institutions. Citizens who believe that their governments no longer represent them may withdraw their loyalty from traditional political parties and seek alternatives. The growth of populist movements throughout the Western world can be interpreted partly through this lens.

Ibn Khaldun would probably have recognised the importance of such developments. Political authority requires more than laws, institutions and administrative machinery. It depends upon a sufficient degree of social legitimacy and shared commitment. When rulers lose the confidence of those they govern, the political order becomes more vulnerable even if its formal structures remain intact.

The question of cultural cohesion is particularly significant. Ibn Khaldun regarded shared loyalties as essential to political stability, but his concept of asabiyyah should not be reduced to a simplistic doctrine of ethnic uniformity. Collective solidarity can arise through religion, political allegiance, shared institutions and common historical experience. His central insight concerns the capacity of people to recognise obligations extending beyond immediate individual interests.

Modern Western societies are increasingly diverse in religion, ethnicity, culture and political outlook. Diversity does not automatically eliminate social cohesion, and historically many successful societies have incorporated different communities. The challenge is whether a sufficiently strong common civic identity can be maintained amid these differences.

If citizens no longer agree upon basic obligations, legitimate political authority or the principles governing public life, social trust may deteriorate. Groups may increasingly pursue sectional advantages rather than regard themselves as participants in a shared national enterprise.

Australia provides a useful example. Rapid population growth, debates over immigration and multiculturalism, disputes about national identity and declining confidence in major political parties all raise questions about the strength of the country's civic solidarity. These issues cannot be resolved merely through economic calculations or official declarations celebrating diversity. They require serious attention to the conditions under which people develop a shared sense of belonging.

The same problem appears in the United States and Europe, where political polarisation has increasingly transformed disagreement into mutual hostility. Opposing political camps sometimes regard one another not merely as mistaken but as fundamentally illegitimate. Institutions that once commanded broad respect become objects of partisan suspicion.

A civilisation divided into mutually antagonistic groups may retain enormous material power while losing the collective confidence required to exercise that power effectively. Ibn Khaldun's theory suggests that such internal fragmentation can be more dangerous than many external threats.

There is also the question of moral and religious foundations. Ibn Khaldun understood religion as a potentially powerful source of solidarity, capable of strengthening collective purpose beyond the bonds of kinship or immediate material interest. Shared religious convictions could encourage sacrifice, discipline and commitment to objectives extending beyond individual advantage.

For the Christian West, this observation has particular significance. Christianity helped shape Western moral traditions, institutions, education and ideas of personal responsibility, even though Western civilisation also owes profound debts to classical philosophy, Roman law, scientific inquiry and other intellectual traditions.

The decline of Christian belief across much of Europe and other Western societies raises questions about what moral framework will sustain common obligations in its absence. Secular societies can certainly develop ethical commitments and civic solidarity. But it cannot simply be assumed that inherited moral habits will survive indefinitely after the beliefs and institutions that helped cultivate them have weakened.

A society organised increasingly around individual preference, consumption and personal fulfilment may struggle to explain why citizens should accept sacrifice for future generations or for the preservation of institutions from which they receive no immediate personal benefit.

Ibn Khaldun's analysis of luxury therefore has a deeper moral dimension. The danger is not comfort itself, but the displacement of duty by entitlement. When citizens and rulers alike come to regard the satisfaction of immediate desires as the highest political objective, the foundations of long-term collective survival may weaken.

This is particularly relevant to the modern tendency to evaluate political success through short-term economic consumption rather than the preservation of social institutions. A country may enjoy substantial wealth while experiencing declining family formation, weakening community organisations, political alienation and deteriorating confidence in its future.

These developments do not establish that civilisation is collapsing. But they suggest that material prosperity alone is an inadequate measure of social health.

One of Ibn Khaldun's most unsettling insights was that declining regimes could remain outwardly magnificent. Their cities, monuments and administrative institutions might continue to impress observers long after the qualities sustaining their power had begun to deteriorate.

Modern Western civilisation possesses technological capacities that Ibn Khaldun could scarcely have imagined. Its military systems, financial networks, scientific institutions and communications technologies are extraordinarily sophisticated. Yet technological power cannot automatically compensate for political fragmentation, fiscal irresponsibility or the loss of social legitimacy.

Indeed, technological sophistication may sometimes conceal underlying weaknesses. A society can develop increasingly elaborate systems of surveillance, administration and economic management while becoming less capable of generating genuine public loyalty. Political authority may become more technically efficient but less morally persuasive.

There is an obvious danger in applying Ibn Khaldun's theory too mechanically. His principal subject was the rise and fall of dynasties, not modern constitutional democracies or a civilisation spanning numerous sovereign states. Western societies possess mechanisms of institutional adaptation, political competition and technological innovation that differ fundamentally from those available to medieval rulers.

Moreover, the West has repeatedly survived crises that contemporary observers regarded as potentially terminal. Religious wars, revolutions, economic depressions and world wars produced immense destruction without bringing Western civilisation to an end. Institutions can be reformed, social solidarity renewed and economic systems transformed.

The three-generation model should therefore not be treated as a historical countdown clock. Nor should every instance of political conflict, cultural change or economic difficulty be interpreted as evidence of irreversible decline.

Nevertheless, Ibn Khaldun's framework remains valuable because it directs attention towards the internal conditions of political survival. Civilisations do not endure merely because they possess wealth or military technology. They require institutions that retain legitimacy, economies capable of supporting public obligations and citizens who recognise a meaningful common interest.

The contemporary West faces serious questions in each of these areas. Public debt and demographic ageing challenge fiscal sustainability. Political polarisation weakens institutional trust. Cultural fragmentation complicates national solidarity. Technological change threatens established employment patterns and creates new concentrations of economic power. Governments increasingly struggle to reconcile expansive political promises with practical limitations.

None of these problems guarantees collapse. Together, however, they make Ibn Khaldun's analysis uncomfortably relevant.

His greatest lesson may be that civilisational decline is not always imposed from outside. A society can undermine itself by consuming the accumulated achievements of previous generations without renewing the disciplines and commitments that produced them. Its leaders may become more concerned with maintaining privilege than preserving the common good. Its citizens may demand the benefits of civilisation while losing confidence in the institutions necessary to sustain them.

The solution is not a romantic return to medieval hardship or tribal politics. Modern societies cannot and should not abandon the benefits of science, constitutional government and economic development. The challenge is to combine prosperity with responsibility, diversity with civic solidarity, individual freedom with common obligation and political authority with genuine accountability.

For Australia, this would mean treating national cohesion, productive capacity, affordable energy, sustainable public finances and democratic responsiveness as fundamental requirements of long-term national survival rather than secondary considerations subordinate to fashionable political programmes.

For the West more generally, it would require a renewed willingness to defend the institutional and moral foundations of its civilisation while remaining capable of reforming those institutions where they have failed.

Ibn Khaldun was not a prophet predicting the collapse of twenty-first-century Europe, America or Australia. He was a remarkably perceptive analyst of historical processes who understood that power could decay from within long before its outward structures disappeared.

His warning is therefore more disturbing than a prediction of conquest by some external enemy. The greatest danger to a successful civilisation may arise when its own people cease to understand what made their civilisation successful.

The West has not necessarily reached that point. But the possibility that it is moving in that direction deserves serious consideration.

A civilisation does not have to be defeated before it begins to decline. Sometimes it need only forget how it became great.