In April 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence sounded an alarm that reverberated beyond the confines of Whitehall: electric vehicles (EVs), particularly those with Chinese components, pose a potential threat to national security due to their vulnerability to spying by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This warning, echoed by defence scientists at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), has cast a shadow over the government's ambitious plan to transition its 40,000-vehicle fleet to electric by 2027, part of a broader net-zero push. The concern is stark: EVs, described as "mobile spying platforms," could harvest sensitive data—location, conversations, even video—transmitting it to Beijing, where the CCP's National Intelligence Laws mandate cooperation from Chinese firms. I argued that the UK government's fears are well-founded, rooted in China's technological dominance, proven espionage tactics, and the strategic risks of dependency on a geopolitically adversarial state.
Modern EVs are not mere vehicles; they are rolling data hubs, equipped with cameras, microphones, GPS, radar, and Cellular Internet of Things Modules (CIMs) that connect to the internet. A 2023 incident exposed this vulnerability when a Chinese-made SIM card, capable of transmitting location data, was found in a UK government car, embedded in a sealed component from a Chinese supplier. This wasn't an isolated case. Intelligence sources confirmed "disturbing things" uncovered in sweeps of government and diplomatic vehicles, suggesting a systemic issue. The i newspaper reported in April 2025 that RAF Wyton, home to the UK's premier intelligence hub, banned EVs with Chinese components from parking within two miles of key buildings, with similar restrictions at Salisbury Plain. These measures reflect a chilling reality: EVs can record and transmit sensitive information, from ministers' conversations to military site layouts, directly to Chinese servers.
China's dominance in EV production amplifies this threat. Controlling 80% of global battery manufacturing and much of the raw material supply chain, Chinese firms like BYD, SAIC (owner of MG), and NIO produce affordable EVs flooding the UK market. In 2024, nearly 4,700 Chinese-made EVs arrived at Bristol's port on a single ship, a testament to Beijing's export prowess. Under China's 2015 National Intelligence Law, these companies—private or state-owned—must "support, assist, and cooperate" with state intelligence efforts. Cybersecurity expert James Bore notes that EVs "constantly report data back to manufacturers," increasing the risk of "misuse" by adversaries. A former senior civil servant called modern EVs "a big collection of sensors on wheels," capable of mapping sensitive sites or tracking officials' movements. For a government reliant on secure communication, this is a nightmare scenario: a minister discussing policy in a BYD could unwittingly broadcast it to Beijing.
The CCP's track record lends credence to these fears. The FBI's Christopher Wray, in a 2020 speech, described China's counterintelligence efforts as a "grave threat," with the FBI opening a new China-related case every 10 hours. In the UK, the 2023 discovery of a Chinese tracking device in a government car echoed earlier concerns about Huawei, banned from 5G networks in 2020 over espionage risks. MPs like Alicia Kearns, Shadow Security Secretary, warn that EVs could allow the CCP to "know where our prime minister is travelling to," pinpointing vulnerabilities. The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, including Tory MPs like Iain Duncan Smith, argues that Chinese EVs risk "catastrophic" undercutting of the UK car industry, ceding control of critical infrastructure to Beijing.
China's strategic intent is clear: to dominate global technology and leverage it for influence. The UK's Intelligence and Security Committee's 2023 report noted that the CCP's "national imperative" is to maintain power, with its global ambition to become a technological superpower posing a direct threat to British security. EVs are a linchpin in this strategy. Professor Jim Saker, in a 2024 parliamentary submission, called Chinese EVs a "Trojan Horse," capable of collecting "big data" and personal information, or even being remotely disabled to paralyse infrastructure. Imagine a scenario where Beijing halts thousands of EVs on UK motorways during a crisis, as Saker warned, causing chaos. This isn't science fiction; China's own restrictions on Tesla vehicles near sensitive sites, citing data security, show Beijing understands these risks and exploits them domestically.
The EV spying threat mirrors broader anxieties about external influences eroding British sovereignty, much like the sidelining of Easter at Norwood Primary School in Hampshire. Just as Norwood's cancellation of the Easter Bonnet Parade and Service was framed as inclusivity but felt like a demotion of Christian heritage, the influx of Chinese EVs—encouraged by net-zero mandates—prioritises environmental goals over national security and economic autonomy. Both cases reflect a pattern: woke policies (diversity, net-zero) inadvertently open doors to forces—whether ideological or geopolitical—that challenge Britain's cultural and strategic moorings. A secure car industry, free from foreign surveillance, binds the nation's infrastructure. Losing either risks a Britain unmoored, vulnerable to agendas not its own.
Critics of the UK's stance, including Chinese officials, dismiss these concerns as "groundless" and protectionist, arguing that EVs from all countries collect data, not just Chinese ones. The Chinese Embassy told MailOnline in 2024 that their vehicles' popularity stems from "technological innovation and superb quality," not unfair practices, and accused the West of politicising trade. Indeed, Western manufacturers like Tesla also use connected systems, and the UK's failure to regulate data privacy broadly leaves vulnerabilities regardless of origin. Ciaran Martin, former head of the National Cyber Security Centre, cautions against exaggerating risks, noting that Beijing can't "press a button" to control cars en masse. A blanket ban on Chinese EVs could also harm the UK's net-zero goals and raise costs, as Chinese models like the BYD Atto 3 are often cheaper than rivals, or so we are told.
Yet these counterarguments don't negate the core issue. China's legal framework, mandating corporate cooperation with intelligence, sets it apart from Western firms, where such obligations are less explicit. The 2023 tracking device incident and bans at military sites like RAF Wyton aren't speculative—they're evidence of tangible risks. While a total ban may be impractical, targeted measures, like excluding Chinese CIMs from government fleets, are justified. The Huawei precedent shows Britain can act decisively when security is at stake, and EVs demand similar scrutiny.
The UK government's case rests on three pillars: technological vulnerability, China's espionage history, and strategic dependency. EVs' sensors and connectivity, combined with the CCP's legal and geopolitical leverage, create a perfect storm for surveillance. Past incidents—tracking devices, Huawei's 5G risks—prove intent and capability. Relying on Chinese EVs for net-zero risks ceding control of critical infrastructure risks ceding cultural identity. Britain must balance progress with preservation—of security, sovereignty, and self.
This isn't paranoia; it's prudence. In a world where data is power, and cars are computers, the CCP's reach into Britain's roads is a threat too real to ignore. Just as Easter's quiet erosion demands a cultural stand, the EV spying risk demands a security one. Britain must act, or risk driving into Beijing's shadow.
https://dailysceptic.org/2025/04/17/electric-cars-threaten-national-security-defence-chiefs-warn/
"Electric cars pose a potential threat to national security as they are vulnerable to Chinese spying, an official defence assessment by the Government's spy lab has warned. The Telegraph has more.
A report by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) found that there were concerns Beijing – which dominates the market – could effectively eavesdrop on conversations using the vehicles, which are to be introduced for all ministers and officials by the end of 2027.
The warning in the report, which was delivered to the previous Tory government, contributed to fears at senior levels in Rishi Sunak's administration that electric cars were "basically mobile spying platforms" and even those made in the West using Chinese parts were susceptible.
The concerns were raised amid the government fleet going green, given China's dominance in electric vehicles.
Fears of Chinese spying were sufficiently high that the DSTL, an executive agency of the Ministry of Defence, was commissioned to look at so-called "connected vehicles" and whether they were vulnerable to spying by Beijing.
All electric vehicles are deemed to be "connected", meaning that data and information are sent out beyond the vehicle, sometimes over the internet. Increasingly, petrol and diesel cars are also "connected".
It is understood the first assessment from the defence scientists flagged broad concerns that electric vehicles and other connected cars could be used by the Chinese state to spy.
A second, more detailed examination was then commissioned by the Sunak government. That report had not been returned when the snap General Election was called for July 2024, leading to the Tories being removed from office.
One source in the Sunak government close to the conversations called it an "oh s—" moment when the implications of the government's electronic vehicle push were realised.
The source said: "They are basically mobile spying platforms. The array of data you can pick up from these things is extraordinary, particularly conversations that happened in the car."