Australia's response to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threat, whether from a solar event like a Carrington-level geomagnetic storm or a nuclear-induced EMP, appears to be limited and lacks a publicly detailed, comprehensive plan. I'll outline the current state of Australia's preparedness based on available information, and then detail the potential effects of a new Carrington solar EMP and a nuclear EMP on Australia, given the absence of a specific national strategy. As far as I am aware no-one from the freedom movement has ever written on this topic, even though the consequences are totally apocalyptic. John Steele, ex-army survivalist expert will discuss what you and your family could do in the worst-case scenario. In past articles at the blog I have also discussed the literature from defence experts who do not rule out a nuclear attack upon US military installations in Australia such as Pine Gap, so this issue unlike climate change is a real one, with enormous consequences.
There is little publicly available information on a specific Australian plan to address EMP threats, whether from solar events or nuclear attacks. Unlike the United States, which has established initiatives like the Congressional EMP Commission and executive orders such as the 2019 Presidential Executive Order 13865 on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses, Australia has not prominently featured EMP preparedness in its national security or infrastructure protection strategies.
General Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Focus: Australia's national security efforts have primarily focused on cybersecurity and physical threats to critical infrastructure. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) and the Critical Infrastructure Centre (CIC) under the Department of Home Affairs work to protect critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks, sabotage, and espionage. However, these frameworks do not explicitly address EMP threats, which differ significantly from cyber threats due to their physical, electromagnetic impact on electronics and power grids.
Space Weather Monitoring: Australia does engage in space weather monitoring, which includes tracking solar events that could lead to a Carrington-level geomagnetic storm. The Bureau of Meteorology's Space Weather Services provides forecasts and warnings for solar activity, such as coronal mass ejections (CMEs), that could affect satellite operations, aviation, and power grids. However, this is more about monitoring and early warning rather than a robust mitigation or resilience plan for an EMP event.
Lack of Specific EMP Hardening: There is no evidence of a national program to harden Australia's electrical grid or critical infrastructure against EMPs, unlike some efforts in the U.S. and Europe. For example, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has released strategies like the 2018 Strategy for Protecting and Preparing the Homeland against Threats from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD), which Australia lacks an equivalent for. Australia's power grid, managed by entities like the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), has not publicly outlined EMP-specific resilience measures, such as installing geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) protection devices or EMP shielding for high-voltage transformers.
Defence and Military Considerations: The Australian Defence Force (ADF) likely has some internal protocols for EMP threats, given its collaboration with allies like the U.S., where EMP risks are well-documented in military doctrine. However, public defence strategies, such as the 2024 National Defence Strategy, focus more on conventional threats (e.g., regional conflicts, cyber warfare) and do not explicitly mention EMP preparedness. Military bases in Australia, like their U.S. counterparts, rely heavily on the civilian power grid, which is vulnerable to EMP events.
International Context and Awareness: Research from Yoshida Reiji in 2016, published by the Tokyo-based Center for Information and Security Trade Control, warned that a high-altitude EMP attack would severely damage Japan's power, communications, and transport systems, as well as disable banks, hospitals, and nuclear power plants. Given Australia's similar reliance on interconnected infrastructure, this warning is relevant, yet there's no indication Australia has acted on such concerns with a tailored EMP strategy.
In summary, Australia lacks a publicly documented, comprehensive plan to address EMP threats. While it has mechanisms for monitoring space weather and protecting critical infrastructure from other threats, these do not appear to extend to EMP-specific resilience or mitigation measures.
A Carrington-level solar EMP, caused by a coronal mass ejection (CME) like the 1859 Carrington Event, would have severe consequences for Australia due to its reliance on modern technology and lack of EMP-specific grid hardening. The Carrington Event was the most intense geomagnetic storm in recorded history, causing telegraph systems to fail and catch fire. A similar event today would have far greater impacts given our dependence on electricity and electronics.
Power Grid Failure:
A Carrington-level CME would induce geomagnetic currents in Australia's power grid, particularly affecting high-voltage transformers. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the U.S. has identified transformers as a weak link, and Australia's grid faces similar vulnerabilities. A 2020 analysis notes that the simultaneous loss of just 9 critical transformers in the U.S. could lead to a cascading failure; Australia, with a smaller but still interconnected grid, could face a comparable collapse. Transformers could overheat and fail, leading to widespread blackouts lasting weeks to months, even years, as replacement transformers have lead times of 12–24 months under normal conditions.
Communications Disruption:
The CME would disrupt Australia's communications infrastructure, including cell towers, telecommunications switches, and satellite systems. The 1989 geomagnetic storm in Quebec caused a 9-hour blackout; a Carrington-level event could be 10 times stronger, potentially disabling communications for days or weeks, or months. Australia's reliance on satellite-based systems for regional connectivity (e.g., the NBN Sky Muster satellite for rural areas) would be particularly vulnerable, as solar plasma can damage satellites or drag them out of orbit by heating the upper atmosphere.
Transportation and Logistics:
Australia's transportation sector would be heavily impacted. Air traffic control systems, reliant on GPS and radar, could fail due to atmospheric interference from the CME, as seen during the 2003 Halloween Storm, which disrupted GPS navigation for 30 hours. Shipping, critical for Australia's import-dependent economy, would face challenges if navigation systems on vessels are affected. Additionally, fuel distribution would halt if gas stations' electronic systems are damaged, exacerbating supply chain disruptions.
Economic and Social Impact:
A 2013 study using Carrington Event data estimated a similar event would cost the U.S. $600 billion to $2.6 trillion (3.6–15.5% of GDP). Australia's smaller economy would still face billions in damages, potentially 5–10% of its GDP, given its $1.7 trillion GDP in 2024. Socially, prolonged blackouts would disrupt water supply (pumps rely on electricity), healthcare (hospitals would lose power for critical equipment), and food supply (refrigeration and logistics would fail), leading to potential public unrest and health crises.
Research facilities like the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) could face operational challenges if their electrical systems are damaged.
A nuclear EMP, or high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP), occurs when a nuclear warhead is detonated tens to hundreds of miles above the Earth's surface, releasing gamma rays that interact with the atmosphere to produce a powerful EMP. Given Australia's geopolitical position and lack of EMP hardening, the effects would be catastrophic.
Widespread Electronics Damage:
A HEMP detonated 25 miles above Australia would destroy most unprotected electronics across a large area, potentially the size of the continent. This includes high-voltage transformers, vehicles, computers, and medical equipment. The 1962 Starfish Prime test, a 1.4-megaton detonation 250 miles above the Pacific, damaged electronics 900 miles away in Hawaii. A similar detonation over central Australia could affect Sydney, Melbourne, and Perth simultaneously, given the country's relatively flat terrain and lack of geographical barriers to limit EMP spread.
Power Grid Collapse:
Australia's power grid, like the U.S.'s, is highly vulnerable, with 99% of military bases relying on civilian electricity. A HEMP would cause a nationwide blackout by frying transformers and control systems. The U.S. EMP Commission estimated that one year after a large-scale EMP, 90% of Americans could die due to cascading effects like starvation and disease; Australia would face a similar fate, with urban centres like Sydney and Melbourne hardest hit due to their dense populations and reliance on electricity for water, food, and healthcare, discussed below.
Communications and Defence Impact:
A HEMP would disable Australia's communications infrastructure, including military systems. The ADF's global navigation systems for precision targeting would fail, as noted in a 2024 Carnegie Council report. Cell phones and radios might survive if not plugged in, but their supporting infrastructure (e.g., cell towers) would be destroyed, isolating communities and hindering emergency response. Defence capabilities would be severely degraded, leaving Australia vulnerable to further attacks or regional instability.
Transportation and Supply Chain Breakdown:
Vehicles with electronic components (most modern cars) would stall, stranding people and halting logistics. Ports, critical for Australia's import of the majority of its fuel and goods, would cease operations if cranes, computers, and navigation systems fail. The 2016 Yoshida Reiji study highlighted similar risks for Japan, noting that a HEMP would disable banks, hospitals, and transport systems—impacts that would be mirrored in Australia.
Long-Term Societal Collapse:
Without electricity, water treatment plants would fail within days, leading to sanitation crises. Hospitals would lose life-saving equipment, and food spoilage would cause shortages within weeks. Australia's remote geography, while a strategic advantage in conventional warfare, would exacerbate isolation, as rural communities would be cut off from aid. The U.S. EMP Commission warned that a HEMP could be a "civilization killer," and Australia, with its smaller population and resource constraints, would struggle to recover without international assistance—which might not be forthcoming in a global nuclear conflict.
Peter Pry, a former CIA officer and head of the EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security, has frequently cited a worst-case scenario for the U.S. following a high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) attack, estimating a die-off of up to 90% of the population within a year due to cascading failures in infrastructure, leading to starvation, disease, and societal collapse. This figure is often referenced in his writings, such as in reports from the EMP Commission, which he contributed to, and his advocacy for grid hardening. For urbanised Australia, we can estimate a comparable die-off figure by considering its unique demographic, geographic, and infrastructural context, while critically examining Pry's assumptions and applying them to Australia's urban population.
Pry's 90% die-off estimate for the U.S. is based on a HEMP attack that disables the electrical grid, communications, transportation, and critical infrastructure across the continent. The U.S. EMP Commission (2008) and Pry's subsequent works outline that without electricity, water treatment, food distribution, healthcare, and sanitation would fail, leading to mass casualties from starvation, disease (e.g., cholera from contaminated water), exposure, and violence. The U.S. has a population of approximately 330 million (2025 estimate), with 83% living in urban areas, making it highly dependent on interconnected systems.
Australia, by contrast, has a population of about 27 million (2025 estimate, based on ABS projections). It is one of the most urbanised countries globally, with 86% of its population living in urban areas (per World Bank 2023 data), concentrated in cities like Sydney (5.3 million), Melbourne (5.1 million), Brisbane (2.6 million), Perth (2.2 million), and Adelaide (1.4 million). This urban concentration makes Australia particularly vulnerable to an EMP event, as its population relies heavily on centralised infrastructure for food, water, and energy, much like the U.S. However, Australia's smaller population, vast geography, and unique environmental challenges (e.g., water scarcity, extreme heat) require adjustments to Pry's estimate.
To estimate a die-off figure for urban Australia post-EMP, I will break down the key factors:
Power Grid Collapse:
As discussed above, a HEMP would likely cause a nationwide blackout in Australia by frying high-voltage transformers and control systems. The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) manages a grid that, like the U.S.'s, is not hardened against EMPs. Urban areas, where 86% of Australians live, depend entirely on this grid for water pumping, refrigeration, healthcare, and communications. The U.S. EMP Commission estimated that replacing critical transformers could take 12–24 months under normal conditions—post-EMP, with global supply chains disrupted, this could stretch to years. Urban Australians would face immediate loss of power, with no quick recovery.
Water Supply Failure:
Urban Australia is particularly vulnerable to water shortages. Cities like Melbourne and Sydney rely on electrically powered desalination plants (e.g., the Victorian Desalination Plant) and pumping stations to supply water. Without power, these systems would fail within hours. Sydney's Warragamba Dam, which supplies 80% of the city's water, requires pumps to distribute water to higher elevations—pumps that would stop. A 2019 study by the University of New South Wales estimated that Sydney could face severe water shortages within 3–5 days without power. Dehydration, combined with sanitation-related diseases like dysentery, would spike mortality rates, especially in summer when temperatures in cities like Perth can exceed 40°C (104°F).
Food Supply Disruption:
Australia imports much of its fuel and significant portions of its food (e.g., 70% of processed foods, per 2023 Food Standards Australia data). Urban supermarkets have a 3–5 day food supply under normal conditions. Post-EMP, transportation would halt—trucks, trains, and ships rely on electronic systems that would fail. Ports like Sydney and Melbourne, which handle 40% of Australia's imports, would cease operations. Urban populations would face starvation within weeks. Rural areas might fare better due to local farming, but they house only 14% of the population, and their surplus couldn't reach cities without transport.
Healthcare Collapse:
Hospitals in urban Australia, like Royal Prince Alfred in Sydney, rely on electricity for ventilators, dialysis machines, and refrigeration of medicines (e.g., insulin). Backup generators typically last 24–48 hours, assuming fuel resupply, which wouldn't happen post-EMP. The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2023) notes that 1 in 5 Australians have chronic conditions requiring regular care—diabetes, heart disease, etc. Without power, these patients would die rapidly. Infectious diseases would also surge due to lack of sanitation and clean water, as seen in historical urban outbreaks like cholera in 19th-century London.
Societal Breakdown:
Urban Australia's dense population centres would face chaos as resources dwindle. The 2021 Melbourne anti-lockdown protests, which turned violent, suggest that social unrest could escalate quickly in a crisis. Without communications (cell towers, radios, internet—all disabled by EMP), emergency response would collapse. Police and medical services, reliant on electronic dispatch systems, would be crippled. Looting, violence, and gang activity would likely surge, as seen in historical urban crises like the 2003 New York blackout, but on a far worse scale.
Environmental Factors:
Australia's climate poses unique risks. Summer heatwaves in cities like Adelaide can reach 45°C, and without air conditioning or water, heatstroke deaths would soar—especially among the elderly, who make up 16% of the population (ABS 2023). Conversely, winter in Melbourne (lows of 5°C/41°F) could cause hypothermia if heating fails. Bushfires, a perennial threat, would be unmanageable without firefighting helicopters or communication systems, potentially engulfing suburban areas.
Population Density and Escape Challenges:
Unlike the U.S., where urban populations can flee to less dense rural areas (e.g., from New York to upstate regions), Australia's urban centres are surrounded by vast, arid outback. Sydney residents fleeing to the Blue Mountains would find limited water and food, and the 1,000 km journey to rural Victoria is infeasible without vehicles (most cars would be disabled by EMP). Urbanites lack the skills for off-grid survival, unlike rural or Indigenous communities, who might have a better chance due to traditional knowledge.
Estimating Urban Australia's Die-Off
Pry's 90% figure for the U.S. assumes a near-total grid collapse, with cascading effects killing most of the population within a year. I will adjust this for urban Australia (86% of 27 million = ~23.2 million people):
First Month (Immediate Impacts):
Water and Heat: Within 3–5 days, urban water supplies would run dry. Dehydration and heatstroke could kill 5–10% of the elderly and vulnerable (16% of the population, or ~3.7 million urbanites). Assuming half succumb in the first month due to heat and lack of water, that's ~1.85 million deaths.
Medical Failures: The 20% of Australians with chronic conditions (4.6 million urbanites) would lose access to care. Assuming 50% die within a month without medication (e.g., diabetics without insulin, cardiac patients without pacemakers), that's ~2.3 million deaths.
Total First Month: 1.85M (water/heat) + 2.3M (medical) = ~4.15 million deaths, or 18% of the urban population.
First Three Months (Starvation and Disease):
Food Shortages: By week 4, food supplies in cities would be exhausted. Starvation sets in after 1–2 months without food (humans can survive ~60 days with water but no food). Assuming 70% of the remaining urban population (after first-month losses: 23.2M - 4.15M = 19.05M) can't access food, that's 13.3 million at risk. If 50% die by month 3 due to starvation, that's ~6.65 million deaths.
Disease: Without sanitation, diseases like cholera and dysentery would spread. Historical urban outbreaks (e.g., 1854 London cholera epidemic) had mortality rates of 10–20% without modern medicine. Assuming a 15% mortality rate among the remaining population (19.05M - 6.65M = 12.4M), that's ~1.86 million deaths.
Total by Month 3: 4.15M (first month) + 6.65M (starvation) + 1.86M (disease) = ~12.66 million deaths, or 55% of the urban population.
First Year (Long-Term Effects):
Violence and Exposure: Social unrest and exposure (heat, cold, bushfires) would kill more. Assuming 50% of the remaining urban population (23.2M - 12.66M = 10.54M) dies from violence, exposure, or secondary diseases over the next 9 months, that's ~5.27 million deaths.
Total by Year 1: 12.66M + 5.27M = ~17.93 million deaths, or 77% of the urban population.
Adjustments for Australia's Context:
Mitigating Factors: Australia's urban population might fare slightly better than the U.S.'s due to a smaller, less dense population (easier to manage chaos in some areas) and a culture of resilience (e.g., "mateship" and community support). Rural and Indigenous communities (14% of the population) might supply some food to nearby urban fringes, and Australia's isolation could limit external threats (e.g., invasion during chaos).
Aggravating Factors: Australia's harsher climate (heat, bushfires) and greater reliance on imports (fuel, food) could worsen outcomes. The vast distances between urban centres and arable land make scavenging or relocation nearly impossible without vehicles.
Balancing these factors, urban Australia's die-off could be slightly lower than the U.S.'s 90% but still catastrophic. A conservative estimate, factoring in Australia's unique challenges, suggests a die-off of 80–85% of the urban population within a year, or ~18.6–19.7 million of the 23.2 million urbanites.
Critical Analysis of the Estimate
Pry's 90% figure for the U.S. has been debated. Critics, like those in a 2017 National Academy of Sciences report, argue it's overly pessimistic, as some infrastructure (e.g., small-scale solar panels, manual systems) might survive, and human ingenuity could mitigate impacts. However, Pry's estimate assumes a worst-case scenario: no preparation, no recovery, and a high-altitude EMP affecting the entire nation. Australia's lack of EMP hardening, as noted in the above discussion, aligns with this worst-case assumption, making a high die-off plausible.
The establishment narrative often downplays EMP risks, focusing on more immediate threats like supposed climate change or cyber-attacks. For example, Australia's 2024 National Defence Strategy barely mentions EMPs, despite the growing nuclear capabilities of regional actors like China and North Korea. This complacency ignores the existential threat an EMP poses to urbanised societies, where 86% of Australians live in cities with no off-grid survival skills.
My estimate of 80–85% die-off for urban Australia is slightly lower than Pry's 90% due to potential community resilience and the possibility of rural support, but it's still dire. Urban Australia's dependence on centralised systems, combined with environmental challenges, makes it nearly as vulnerable as the U.S. The lack of preparation exacerbates this risk—unlike the U.S., which has at least some EMP mitigation strategies (e.g., DOE's EMP Resilience Action Plan), Australia has none publicly documented.
In a worst-case EMP scenario, urban Australia could face a die-off of 80–85% of its population within a year, equating to 18.6–19.7 million deaths out of 23.2 million urban residents. This estimate is driven by the collapse of water, food, healthcare, and social order, compounded by Australia's harsh climate and lack of EMP preparedness. While slightly lower than Pry's 90% U.S. figure due to potential mitigating factors, the outcome remains catastrophic, underscoring the urgent need for off-grid survival strategies and national resilience planning.
Australia's lack of a specific EMP response plan is concerning, given the severity of potential impacts. While the country's space weather monitoring is a start, it does not address the physical vulnerabilities of its infrastructure. The U.S. has made some progress, albeit slow, with initiatives like the DOE's EMP Resilience Action Plan, but Australia lags behind. This gap is surprising given Australia's exposure to regional geopolitical tensions, such as those involving China and North Korea, both of which have nuclear capabilities and are known to include EMP attacks in their military doctrines.
The comparison between a solar EMP and a nuclear EMP reveals different challenges. A solar EMP, while devastating, is a natural event with some predictability through space weather monitoring, allowing for limited preparation (e.g., disconnecting circuits, as suggested for ships during a Carrington event). A nuclear EMP, however, is a deliberate act of war, with no warning and broader, more immediate destruction due to the E1, E2, and E3 pulse components, which can fry electronics instantly.
Australia's establishment narrative often downplays such risks, focusing instead on more immediate threats like cyber-attacks. However, this overlooks the existential nature of EMP threats, which could cripple the nation's ability to respond to any other crisis. The lack of public discourse on EMP preparedness may reflect a broader complacency about low-probability, high-impact events, a pattern seen globally until disasters strike.
Australia does not have a publicly detailed plan to address EMP threats, relying instead on general cybersecurity and space weather monitoring frameworks that are insufficient for the scale of the risk. A Carrington-level solar EMP would cause widespread power outages, communications failures, and economic disruption, potentially costing billions and taking months, or years, to recover from. A nuclear EMP, far more destructive, would lead to a near-total collapse of Australia's infrastructure, with long-term societal impacts akin to a "civilization killer." To mitigate these risks, Australia would need to invest in grid hardening, EMP-resistant infrastructure, and a national contingency plan, learning from the U.S. and other nations while addressing its unique geographical and geopolitical vulnerabilities.
This issue needs public discussion, not silence and ignorance.